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This dissertation focuses on a specific area of local public finance, namely the 
performance of the non-rated land secured municipal bond market in California as 
comprised primarily of the Community Facilities District (CFD) bonds1. This market has 
become of growing importance but has not been widely studied until now. In this 
dissertation we analyze the performance and default experience of this market, examine 
its specific characteristics and determine the major factors contributing to the default of 
non-rated CFD bonds. The results we present provide important new information for 
assessing the credit quality of the California non-rated land secured municipal bond 
market and should be beneficial to investors for the better understanding and analysis of 
this market. 
 
The dissertation consists of three essays2. The first essay builds upon existing default rate 
empirical studies of corporate and rated municipal bonds to examine for the first time the 
default experience of the non-rated land secured municipal bond market in California. 
The results we obtain demonstrate that the performance of this market is comparable to 
that of BB and B rated municipal bonds by Standard & Poor’s, which implies that another 
look should be taken at the valuation of non-rated CFD bonds and the means of 
determining their credit risk to reflect their moderate likelihood of default. 
                                                 
1 For a list of abbreviations, please refer to Appendix C of Chapter II.  
2 The composition of the data for the essays was the subject of considerable effort on our side and 
constitutes part of the originality of our research. 
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The second essay translates a real life case of a defaulted non-rated CFD and explores the 
situation of curing partial default and the potential conflict that might arise among the 
participants in such a district. We believe that the stylized model we build can provide 
useful insights to both the issuer of CFD bonds and the developers involved in a CFD on 
how to most efficiently structure workouts or settlements in order to cure the partially 
defaulted bond issue. 
 
In the third essay we extend the research on the determinants of default occurrence 
among high yield corporate bonds to account for the non-rated CFD bonds in California. 
We refine the variables included in previous studies to reflect the specific nature of the 
non-rated CFD bonds and use the multinomial logit model to determine the relative 
importance of each of those factors on the change in the status of a CFD bond from 
“normal” to redeemed or defaulted. Our model incorporates the aging effect and various 
macroeconomic factors that affect the California non-rated land secured market. 
 
This dissertation is mainly empirical and contributes to the literature in that it provides 
new insights on a growing municipal market segment that has been largely unexamined 
by existing default research. This study offers market participants and investors a better 
understanding of the underlying credit quality of non-rated CFD bonds. It also 
demonstrates the impacts of certain macro- and microeconomic factors in explaining the 
likelihood of non-rated land secured defaults and helps better assess the credit risk of 
non-rated CFD bonds.  
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Introduction and Review of the Existing Literature 
1 Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of three essays in the area of local public finance. It is mainly 
empirical and examines for the first time the default experience of the non-rated 
Community Facilities District (CFD) bond1 market in California. The results we present 
provide important new information for assessing the credit quality of that market and 
help determine the major factors contributing to the default of non-rated CFD bonds. In 
the remaining part of this introductory chapter, we provide a brief overview of the local 





Finding mechanisms to finance public infrastructure has always been an essential need of 
local governments. Their inherent power of taxation has served as the traditional source 
of revenues used to fund public projects. California is no exception. One of the earliest 
means of financing public improvements and facilities in the State of California was the 
Improvement Bond Act of 1915 that enabled local governments to levy special 
assessments to finance improvements benefiting the land in a well-defined and limited 
area. General obligation bonds, which are backed by the full faith and credit of the issuer 
and the ability to levy ad valorem taxes, were another source of financing.  
                                                 
1 Bonds secured by special taxes levied to finance public infrastructure in California. For more details 
related to this and other terms introduced in this chapter, please refer to Section II of Chapter II. 
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However, the approval of Proposition 13 in June 1978 reduced local property tax 
revenues, since it instituted a one-percent cap on property tax rates and rolled back 
property values for tax purposes to their 1975-1976 level. Furthermore, Proposition 13 
limited annual increases in property tax bills to two percent and allowed reassessment 
only when property ownership changed. In addition, Proposition 13 required a two-thirds 
voter approval of state tax increases, thus making raising taxes more difficult and 
imposing restrictions on the taxing authority of local governments. In reality, Proposition 
13 fundamentally changed the means of financing public services. 
 
In her study “Guide to Public Debt Financing in California”, Virginia L. Horler 
summaries the impact of the approval of Proposition 13 in 1978. She shows that 
financing volume in California decreased immediately after that. However, there was still 
need for building and maintaining public infrastructure. Consequently, the state and local 
governments sought alternative financing methods for funding capital improvements and 
started utilizing revenue bonds and leases with certificates of participation instead of 
general obligation bonds. Another financing instrument was provided by the passage of 
the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act in California in 19822, which offered greater 
flexibility and allowed for the funding of a wider variety of improvements and services 
than earlier financing methods by enabling local agencies with taxing authority, with 
voter approval, to form a community facilities district, issue debt and levy a special tax. 
 
                                                 
2 Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982, as amended, being Sections 53311 et seq. of the 
California Government Code. 
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Had Proposition 13 not passed, CFDs would most likely not have come into existence. 
Prior to the approval of Proposition 13, cities paid for new infrastructure through 
increases in property taxes. However, as we described earlier in this section, Proposition 
13 limited the ability of local governments to increase property taxes and thus served as a 
catalyst for the emergence of the CFD bonds3, which acted as an alternative instrument to 
fund local public improvements. The CFD bond market has since become of growing 
importance but has not been widely studied. In subsequent chapters we analyze the 
performance and default experience of that market, examine its specific characteristics 
and determine the major factors contributing to the default of CFD bonds. 
 
3 Review of the Existing Literature 
 
Default risk and credit quality have been the subject of numerous studies utilizing both 
actuarial and parametric methods. Altman and Saunders (1997) describe the research 
published over the past few decades on statistical models of debt default and loss. Gordy 
(2000) and Crouhy et al. (2000) discuss the advances in modeling credit risk and present 
a comparison of the variety of parametric models that have been developed and 
implemented by the financial institutions in assessing and managing portfolio risk. In 
their studies they show that those models are not utterly different from each other in 
terms of the approach to portfolio credit risk. Their research demonstrates that the 
differences in the obtained results among alternative parametric models are mainly due to 
                                                 
3 Although Proposition 13 served as the catalyst for the introduction of the CFD bonds, its particular 
features do not interact with the community facilities districts (and the assessment districts) that we study in 
the next chapter. Proposition 13 applies to the regular ad valorem tax, while the special taxes and special 
assessments utilized in such districts are separate from the regular property taxes and lie outside the 
guidelines of Proposition 13.  
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the difference in the choice of functional forms and distributional assumptions. What 
these models have in common is the fact that they are primarily based on credit migration 
analysis, i.e. the likelihood of transitioning from one credit quality to another, including 
default, within a given time period.  
 
Such studies describe default as the event in which an obligor fails to make a payment 
related to a loan or bond obligation, whether that refers to the payment of interest or the 
redemption of principal at maturity. Debt contracts maintain cross-default clauses in 
which “when the firm misses a single payment on a debt, it is declared in default on all of 
its obligations” (Grouhy et al., 2000). That is why many studies, both actuarial and 
parametric, view default as an absorbing state, i.e. once the issuer is in default, it stays in 
default.  
 
The existing literature differentiates between technical default and monetary default. In 
their study, which is based on a performance analysis of public finance issuers’ 
unenhanced4 debt obligations and which demonstrates the default history and rating 
transitions5 of the “traditional public finance market6”, Woodell and Montrone (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2004) define default as recorded “upon the first occurrence of monetary 
payment default on the relevant obligation.” They argue that “technical defaults, such as 
covenant violations, are not payment defaults” and should thus be excluded from the 
                                                 
4 I.e., “obligations not relying on external support provided by guaranties, outside support, or alternative 
revenue streams.” 
5 Change in bond ratings of a particular issue, which is either being upgraded or downgraded throughout its 
life. 
6 As represented by entities such as cities, towns, school districts, and hospitals, as well as the bonds issued 
by them. 
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analysis. In their default analysis of Moody’s-rated issuers in the US tax-exempt 
municipal market, Washburn et al. (Moody’s, 2002) extend the definition of default to the 
event of missed or delayed debt service payment, when the bond obligor “ceded its 
authority to make debt payments to a third party that resulted in the suspension of 
payments to bondholders,” or when “there was an exchange in which the bondholders 
accepted a package of securities that were deemed to be of diminished financial 
obligation.” These definitions will be considered when characterizing default in this 
study. 
 
Despite the numerous studies, most of the empirical work has focused on analyzing the 
default rate of a specific asset class: publicly traded corporate bonds that belong to one of 
the credit rating categories assigned by the credit agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s 
and Fitch).  Hickman (1958), Altman and Nammacher (1985, 1987), Altman (1989), 
Asquith et al. (1989), Altman & Kishore (1998), etc. are some examples of such analyses. 
In these studies, the main factor of credit risk is the underlying assets’ rating and “the 
associated expected and unexpected migration patterns” (Altman et al., 2000). Migration 
is defined as the change in credit quality from the initial base state, i.e. the upgrade or 
downgrade of a security from its original rating over a specified time horizon, with the 
“most important and costly negative migration” being to default.  
 
Further studies have examined the default occurrence among private placements of bonds 
or insurance companies’ investments (e.g., Carey, 1998), while others have traced the 
annual and cumulative default rates on rated municipal bonds. In 2000, Altman and 
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Suggitt published a mortality rate analysis that was the first assessment of the default rate 
of a credit asset class that, up to that point, had remained unexplored – commercial bank 
loans. There has been no prior empirical default analysis, however, of non-rated 
municipal bonds, especially, of a specific subset of non-rated bonds – the non-rated land-
secured Mello-Roos bonds, which were introduced with the passage of the California 
Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982, and which have become of growing 
importance ever since.  
 
In the default literature, numerous parametric studies have looked for an explanation of 
the fluctuations in default rates, trying to determine the major factors that contribute to 
the variation in default occurrence. Fons (1991), Helwege and Kleiman (1996), Jonsson 
and Fridson (1996), Jonsson, Fridson, and Zhong (1996), among others, developed 
statistical models which identified that default was influenced by three major factors: 
credit quality, the state of the economy, and the age of the bonds under investigation.  
 
Fons’ model included only two of these factors, credit quality and macroeconomic 
conditions, and found that over half of the variation in default rates over time could be 
explained using those factors. To model credit quality, Fons used the credit ratings of the 
bonds he studied, tracking the distribution of issuers within each rating category over 
time. He then multiplied that distribution by the historical average one-year default rate 
for each rating category and came up with the annual expected default rate for the high 
yield market. The Blue Chip consensus forecast of GNP growth at the start of the year 
was another explanatory variable in his model that served as a proxy for how default is 
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impacted by macroeconomic effects. The results obtained by Fons showed that variation 
in default rates is negatively correlated with changes in the real GNP and positively 
correlated with changes in the fraction of lower rated bonds in the high yield market.  
 
Later studies built upon Fons’ model. Helwege and Kleiman (1996), for example, 
recognized that a few defaults occurred in the first few years after issuance and that 
defaults were, in fact, most likely to occur three years after the bonds have been issued. 
To account for that, their model incorporated the so-called “aging factor”, which 
measured the impact of the length of time that risky bonds were outstanding on the 
default rate. The aging effect was modeled by adding an explanatory variable 
representing “the dollar amount of B3-rated issues outstanding lagged three years”. In 
addition, the authors also suggested that default rates were not symmetrically affected by 
changes in macroeconomic factors. They argued that the effect of a decline in the GDP 
growth below a certain threshold would impact investment-grade bonds less than bonds 
from the speculative-grade category. In order to measure that effect, Helwege and 
Kleiman added a recession indicator variable that equaled one if GDP growth was equal 
to or fell below 1.5%. They further formed an interaction variable by multiplying the 
recession indicator variable by the expected default rate (as measured in the Fons model). 
Using the newly formed interaction variable, Helwege and Kleiman showed that a high 
fraction of lower rated bonds issued in the high yield market is more likely to lead to an 
increase in default rates in the case of an economic downturn than the “distribution of 
higher tier speculative grade credits.”  
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Jonsson and Fridson (1996) and Jonsson, Fridson, and Zhong (1996) further extended the 
Fons model by developing a statistical framework similar to that of Helwege and 
Kleiman. They, too, studied the three major factors influencing default: credit quality, the 
state of the economy, and the aging effect. The independent variables in their models 
were able to explain almost 87% of the variation in the annual default rates of Moody’s 
speculative-grade bonds. Jonsson and Fridson’s model combined two factors in one 
variable, “the fraction of high yield bond issuance rated B3 or lower by Moody’s lagged 
by three years”, which measured simultaneously the aging effect7 and the credit quality8. 
In addition, the authors used different proxies for the macroeconomic effects that were 
“more closely tied to the financial health of corporations” and thus had greater 
explanatory power – corporate profits and the liabilities of failed businesses. Jonsson, 
Fridson, and Zhong (1996), on the other hand, further extended these models by 
including variables9 which attempted to “assess the investor optimism in the market” and 
“the accessibility of the equity markets as alternative or supplemental sources of 
financing for risky borrowers,” rather than measure the state of the economy. Their study 
showed that default rates were inversely related to successful IPOs and high price-to-
earnings ratios.  
 
However, all these studies analyzed the fluctuations in the default rates and occurrence of 
corporate bonds. There has been no prior statistical analysis of the non-rated land-secured 
Mello-Roos bonds (CFD bonds) issued in California.  
                                                 
7 As represented by the lag. 
8 As measured by the fraction of low rated bonds. 
9 Those variables included the NASDAQ price-to-earnings ratio, the Standard & Poor’s price-to-earnings 
ratio, the difference between the S&P price-to-earnings ratio and the NASDAQ price-to-earnings ratio, and 
gross proceeds of initial public offerings (IPOs).  
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Our study is organized as follows. In Chapter Two, we analyze for the first time the 
default experience of the non rated land-secured market in California for the period 1985-
2005. In Chapter Three we construct a stylized model of curing a Community Facilities 
District’s default, and in Chapter Four we examine the factors affecting the default 
occurrence of the Mello-Roos bonds and build upon previously existing models by 
refining the variables they use to reflect the characteristics of the non-rated land-secured 
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While default rate empirical studies of corporate and rated municipal bonds are 
now commonplace there has never been a study of the default experience of the 
non-rated land secured market in California, which has lately become of growing 
importance. This paper examines for the first time the default experience of that 
market during the period 1985-2005 and shows that its performance is 
comparable to that of BB and B rated municipal bonds. The results of our study 
provide important new information for assessing the default risk of the California 
non-rated land secured market and provide market participants and investors 
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Municipal debt is generally considered as bearing low risk compared to corporate debt 
but credit risk varies depending on the municipal sector. For a long time there has been a 
perception in the municipal bond market that the Mello-Roos and Assessment District 
bonds1 sold on that market bear high risk, but while most of the prior empirical work has 
concentrated on corporate or rated municipal bonds, there has not yet been a study of the 
default risk of the non-rated land secured market. This has potentially resulted in the 
under-pricing of such securities as a result of the implied weakness in their credit quality. 
In 1997, the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission2 wrote that for the 
entire 1982-1997 period, the average rate of default for Mello-Roos bonds was probably 
around 5% and argued that this rate was high compared to any capital market or sector. 
The Commission further reported that various research studies had shown the default rate 
for the entire municipal market to be at less than 1%, and the default rate for the 
corporate securities market, which is highly regulated, to be at about 2%.   
 
This paper for the first time looks at data that allows a comprehensive study of the non-
rated land secured market. This market has lately become of growing importance, 
especially in California, after the introduction of the Mello-Roos Community Facilities 
Act of 19823. In this study, we estimate the marginal and cumulative default rates for 
Mello-Roos and Assessment District bonds that were issued in California from 1985 to 
2004, as well as for the entire non-rated land secured municipal market comprised of 
                                                 
1 Bonds secured by special taxes or assessments levied to finance public infrastructure in California. For 
more details please refer to Section II. 
2 “Debt Line”, November 1997 
3 Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982, as amended, being Sections 53311 et seq. of the 
California Government Code. 
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those bonds. Default estimates are based on a total sample of 1,230 CFD bond issues 
totaling $14,676 million and 2,307 AD bond issues totaling $12,415 million. For the data 
samples we have utilized Altman’s mortality rate methodology. The results obtained from 
this analysis are further used to determine the historical default rates of the non-rated 
Mello-Roos and Assessment District bonds in our sample and find out whether, in accord 
with the municipal bond market perception, they do indeed show significantly high 
default rates. As a next step, the performance of these bonds is compared to that of other 
municipal bonds from various rating classes, where we show that it, in fact, is 
comparable to the performance of BB and B rated U.S. municipal bonds. The results of 
this study provide an important contribution to the proper assessment of the credit risk 
associated with Mello-Roos and Assessment District bonds and the overall credit quality 
of the non-rated land-secured market in California. 
 
2 Background 
2.1 Assessment District and Mello-Roos Bond Financing 
 
The approval of the Improvement Act of 1911, the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913, 
and the Improvement Bond Act of 1915 provided local agencies with a means of 
financing public infrastructure. This legislation enabled local governments to levy special 
assessments and form special financing districts, called assessment districts (AD), that 
include property that would receive direct benefit from the construction of new public 
improvements. The most common types of public infrastructure financed by those 
districts include streets, curbs, gutters, water or sewer systems, etc. To fund such projects 
assessments are levied on all the properties in an assessment district in proportion to the 
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benefit derived from the improvements. Bonds are then sold and repaid from the special 
assessments received. While individual 1911 Act bonds are payable from the assessments 
on one specific property only, 1915 Act bonds are payable from all assessments 
collected.  
 
Assessment District financing was one way of funding public infrastructure. As discussed 
in the Introductory Chapter, however, in June 1978, California voters enacted Proposition 
13. Proposition 13 reduced local property tax revenues by more than 50% by introducing 
a 1% cap on property tax rates and rolling back property values for tax purposes to their 
1975-1976 level. Reassessment was allowed generally only when property changed 
ownership and annual increases in property tax bills were capped at 2%.  Increasing state 
taxes were required to receive 2/3 legislature approval and the taxing authority of local 
governments became more restricted. These factors made raising taxes more difficult and 
limited the ability of local governments to fund public infrastructure. There was a need 
for a new funding mechanism that provided greater flexibility and addressed the growing 
demand for financing public improvements.  
 
Proposition 13 served as the catalyst for the introduction of such alternative. The 
necessary flexibility was provided by the passage of the Mello-Roos Community 
Facilities Act in California in 1982 (The Act), which offered an alternative vehicle for 
financing capital improvements. The Act allowed the funding of the construction or 
acquisition of real or tangible property with a useful life of five years or more, such as 
streets, sewers, etc. It also allowed schools, police and fire services, as well as other 
services to be financed to accommodate the growing needs of developing areas. The Act 
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provided greater flexibility and allowed for the funding of a wider variety of 
improvements and services than earlier financing methods.   
 
Under the Mello-Roos Act, local government agencies with taxing authority may, with 
voter approval, form a community facilities district (CFD), issue debt and levy a special 
tax. The local jurisdiction’s legislative body forms a community facilities district with 
boundaries to include property that will derive benefit from the improvements that are 
proposed to be financed. In most cases, the improvements will be financed by the 
issuance of bonds. The bonds are then repaid by a special tax levied annually and 
collected on the annual property tax bill for each parcel within the CFD. In order to levy 
special tax, the Constitution of the State of California requires a two-thirds voter approval 
to authorize the CFD, the bonded indebtedness and the annual special tax levy. If there 
are less than twelve registered voters living in the CFD, a landowner vote is held, 
allowing each property owner one vote for each acre of land owned. The special tax then 
becomes a continuing lien against the property and may be levied for up to 40 years to 
repay the bonds issued. Some CFDs do not issue bonds but use the special tax instead to 
directly fund services on a pay-as-you-go basis. Please refer to Exhibit A for an 
illustration of the initiation and formation process of a CFD.4  
 
2.2 Special Tax Levy under the Mello-Roos Bond Act 
 
Mello-Roos bonds are secured by special tax revenues on the property for which such 
Bonds are being issued. Special tax revenues are the proceeds of the special taxes levied 
                                                 
4 In addition, Exhibit B provides a comparison between CFDs and 1915 Act Assessment Districts.  
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in each fiscal year on each taxable property within the CFD as determined by the Rate 
and Method of Apportionment (RMA), or special tax formula, of the CFD.  Typically, the 
special tax formula classifies the property within the CFD as either “developed” or 
“undeveloped” according to the occurrence of certain events: the issuance of a building 
permit, recordation of a final map or the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. Once 
property is classified, the aggregate special tax is apportioned to each parcel. Generally, 
developed property is taxed first, up to a certain percentage of its maximum special tax. 
Then, to the extent that sufficient revenue cannot be generated from developed property, 
undeveloped property is taxed as necessary up to its maximum special tax amount. The 
amount of special taxes that is collected each year is generally defined as the amount 
sufficient to pay the administrative expenses for the CFD, the regularly scheduled debt 
service payments for that year (including principal and interest payments), any amount 
required to replenish any reserve fund established in connection with the bonds, any 
reasonably anticipated delinquent special taxes for the previous fiscal year, and any 
remarketing costs and credit enhancement and liquidity fees. Thus, special taxes are 
levied in an amount that is sufficient to pay administrative expenses and provide special 
tax revenues in an amount equal to 110% of maximum annual debt service on the 
outstanding bonds. This 110% coverage serves as a cushion against unexpected failure to 
collect all taxes due to make the debt service payments on the bonds. Special 
assessments, on the other hand, may only be levied in an amount equal to up to 100% of 
the pro rata share of the bonds. 
 
Special taxes, as well as special assessments, are collected in the same manner and at the 
same time as ordinary ad valorem property taxes. Special taxes have the same priority 
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and bear the same proportionate penalties and interest after delinquency as do the ad 
valorem taxes on interests in real property. Generally, for CFDs, ad valorem and special 
taxes do not exceed two percent of the property value. They are generally levied based on 
their assigned rate but, in cases of delinquency in the tax payment of some properties, the 
tax levy can be increased to its maximum level, as set in the RMA.  
 
Although the maximum special tax generates sufficient revenue to meet or exceed debt 
service payment, in cases when debt service payments increase on an annual basis, the 
maximum special tax may need to escalate5. In order to have an increased capacity to 
cover potential delinquencies, some CFDs may choose to have special tax escalators even 
though their debt service payments do not increase. The typical maximum special tax 
escalator is 2% but some CFDs may have different escalation rates.6 Under no 
circumstances, however, can the special taxes on one property be increased as a 
consequence of delinquency or default by the owner of another property by more than ten 
percent per fiscal year. 
 
2.3 Reserve Fund 
 
Upon the issuance of the Mello-Roos bonds and assessment district bonds, a debt service 
reserve fund (DSRF) is created and established in an amount equal to the reserve 
requirement. This fund is required by the market to help protect the bond holders in the 
                                                 
5 In contrast, special assessments are fixed for the life of the bonds. 
6 Modifications to Section 53321 of the Government Code relating to the special tax set limit on the annual 
escalation of the maximum special tax, depending on the type of property. Per that amendment, the annual 
escalation rate of the maximum special tax on residential property cannot exceed 2% (unless the CFD was 
formed by a vote of registered voters.) In addition, the actual special tax levy may be less than the 
maximum in a given year and may increase in future years. 
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event of delinquency. DSRF also protects the issuer of the bonds. In cases of insufficient 
special tax or special assessment revenues due to missed or delayed payments, money 
from the DSRF is drawn upon to make the debt service payment due and to avoid default 
on the bonds. The reserve requirement for this fund is limited per Federal Tax Law, as of 
any date of calculation, as no more than the lesser of three tests, i.e. the lesser of (i) 10% 
of the outstanding principal amount of the bonds, (ii) maximum annual debt service on 
the outstanding bonds, or (iii) 125% of average annual debt service on the outstanding 
bonds. As specified earlier, all amounts deposited in the DSRF can be used and 
withdrawn solely in the event of any deficiency of the amount required for the payment 
of principal and interest and any premium on the bonds (or for the purpose of redeeming 
all bonds, if adequate to do so).  
 
To reduce the risk of delinquency of special taxes, some jurisdictions may require an 
additional form of security for the bonds when the concentration of ownership in the 
district is high, but this varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Depending on the Local 
Goals and Policies of the issuer, lack of diversification of ownership is observed when a 
developer or property owner owns more than a certain percentage of the property within 
the district7 and is thus responsible for a significant portion of the special tax levied in the 
district. In such cases, the developer is required to provide a letter of credit (LOC) from a 
bank satisfactory to the district in an amount that varies from CFD to CFD but is 
generally calculated based on the gross debt service on the bonds for a certain period. For 
example, the LOC amount may be equal to the gross debt service on the bonds for the 
                                                 
7 For some CFDs that means 25% or more, for others that is 30% or more, while yet for others, that limit 
can be 33% or more of the property within the district. 
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current and coming fiscal year (the stated amount), or to one year’s worth of debt service 
on the bonds, etc. In the event of delinquency in the special taxes owed by such 
developer, the amount in the LOC is reduced by the amount of the delinquent taxes due. 
Such amount is used to replenish the DSRF, from which a withdrawal was made to make 
the scheduled debt service payments. After each withdrawal, the stated amount in the 
LOC is reinstated until the LOC can be terminated. Such termination occurs on the date 
which is the earliest of: (i) a specified date a year or two years from the date of issuance 
of the bonds; (ii) the date on which the stated amount is permanently reduced to zero 
pursuant to drawing(s) under the LOC or (iii) the date upon which the developer owns 
less than that specified percentage of the property within the district.8 Assessment 
districts often have similar requirements for the posting of additional form of security in 
cases of high concentration of ownership. 
 
2.4 Events of Default 
 
For each AD and CFD, the issuance and sale of bonds is authorized by a Resolution of 
Issuance (ROI).  In some cases, after the bonds are issued, and in spite of all funds and 
reserves set aside to secure the timely payment of the debt service on those bonds, there 
are instances of default occurrence. Default occurs when there is a missed payment of 
principal or interest on any bond that is due or payable.  
 
As described in the earlier sections, in the case of delinquent assessments and special 
taxes and insufficient revenue to pay debt service on the bonds, there is a draw on the 
                                                 
8 However, the exact triggers for the termination of the LOC vary among CFDs. 
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DSRF in an amount equal to the debt service payment deficit due. The DSRF is then 
replenished by either a transfer from the LOC (if any is required) or from the delayed 
payment of assessments or special taxes. Under this scenario, all payments of principal 
and interest on the bonds have been made on a timely basis (thanks to the balance in the 
DSRF) and there has been no default. If however, the assessments or special taxes are 
delinquent for a longer period and there is no replenishment of the DSRF, such reserve 
fund will be depleted and there will be insufficient money available to pay the principal 
and interest due on the bonds. Thus, by definition, default occurs when there is a failure 
to make the scheduled debt service payment due on the bonds. If the assessments or taxes 
owed are paid subsequent to that default date, along with all penalty and interest, there 
can be sufficient revenue to reinstitute the punctual payment of debt service on the bonds 
and cure the default9. However, if that is not the case, the district remains in default until 
foreclosure action is taken against the delinquent property and such property is sold at a 
judicial foreclosure sale or until a workout has been reached that brings current all 
assessments or special taxes owed. 
 
2.5 Foreclosure of Delinquent Property 
 
In the event of a delinquency in the payment of any installment of assessments or special 
taxes, the district may be obligated to order, commence and diligently prosecute to 
                                                 
9 Thus curing a CFD or AD bond default is very different from curing a corporate bond default. If there are 
delinquencies associated with a CFD or AD bonds, all that is needed to make the bonds current and cure 
the default is to make the missed payments. There is no acceleration clause for the entire amount of debt. 
With corporate bonds, on the other hand, very often if one payment is missed, the entire amount of debt can 
become due and payable, which can make the curing of the default more challenging.  
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judgment an action in the superior court to foreclose the lien of any assessment or special 
tax or installment of assessment or special tax.  
 
The exact timing of foreclosure action and the delinquent amounts that trigger foreclosure 
vary depending on the provisions of the Indenture (or Fiscal Agent Agreement) of a 
particular AD or CFD. The following is an illustration of such indenture provisions. One 
business day after each interest payment date, the amount of special taxes levied in the 
district is compared to the received amount of special tax revenues. If the received 
amount is less than 95% of the levied amount, delinquent owners are notified within 45 
days and required to pay their delinquency immediately. If the delinquency remains 
uncured, foreclosure proceedings are undertaken within 90 days against each delinquent 
parcel of land within the district. Foreclosure is also commenced if any single parcel that 
is subject to the special tax in the CFD is delinquent in the payment of special taxes in the 
aggregate amount of $1,000 or more10. Once the delinquency has been determined, a 
notification is again sent within 45 days to the delinquent property owner and if the 
delinquency remains uncured, foreclosure proceedings are commenced within 90 days.11 
If the reserve fund is depleted, there could be a default or delay in the payment to the 
owners of the bonds pending prosecution of foreclosure proceedings and receipt by the 
district of foreclosure sale proceeds.  
 
Any parcel that is subject to foreclosure sale must be sold at the minimum bid price 
(equal to the sum of delinquent tax installments, penalties, interest, attorney’s fees and 
                                                 
10 Again, exact amounts vary among CFDs. 
11 Similarly, for ADs, bondholders have the right to foreclose on property when taxes are delinquent for a 
certain period (usually 90 to 180 days). Penalties and collection costs must be paid by the delinquent 
property owner. 
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costs of collection and sale) unless a lesser minimum bid price is authorized by the 
owners of 75% of the principal amount of the bonds outstanding. Although a judicial 
foreclosure action can be commenced, there is no assurance that it will be completed or 
that it will be completed in a timely manner. In many cases, such foreclosure sales have 




The existing literature on municipal and corporate bond defaults describes three major 
methodologies for assessing the default rates of the analyzed securities. These 
methodologies have become widely used in the industry and will be the subject of 
discussion in this section.  
 
3.1 Static Pool Methodology 
The Static Pool Methodology is a common tool for the credit analysis of rated municipal 
bonds. Woodell and Montrone’s study (Standard & Poor’s, 2004) tracks the rating history 
of outstanding debt issues and uses this methodology to analyze the rating transitions and 
the default history of those transactions. To avoid magnitude skewing of the results, the 
authors use individual issuances, rather than dollar amounts of issued debt. Since defaults 
are less likely to occur in the first few years of an issue and because results might be 
distorted if the number of issuance increases over the specified period, for which default 
                                                 
12 A recent tendency for many CFDs is the move toward a requirement for the developer(s) within a district 
to post LOC as an additional form of security for the bonds. However, it is unclear how much that move 
has helped, especially given the inability to effectively utilize the foreclosure process in the case of default. 
That inability is reflected in the very long time it takes to complete that process from the start of the 
foreclosure action to the actual sale of the property. 
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rates are calculated as the ratio between the number of defaults and the number of 
outstanding issues, the study creates the so-called “static pools”. A static pool is 
constructed at the beginning of each year covered by the study and tracked from that 
point on. All ratings included in the study are sorted into these pools, which are called 
static because the denominator (i.e., the ratings included in the pool) remains constant 
over time. Woodell and Montrone note that all ratings are tracked annually within each 
pool and that this process necessitates the comparison of each rating on the first and last 
day of each calendar year under investigation. Thus, rating changes within the year are 
not reflected; only beginning and end-of-year ratings are reflected. This implies that if the 
static pool in year t is comprised of all debt outstanding as of the beginning of that year, 
then the static pool associated with year t+1 is formed by adding new ratings first rated in 
year t to the still outstanding ratings of the year t static pool and subtracting those ratings 
that defaulted or were downgraded to non-rated. Annual default rates are further 
calculated for each static pool based on number of issuers in each rating category. 
Cumulative default rates are then estimated that average the experience of all static pools. 
This is achieved by calculating marginal default rates, conditional on survival (i.e., on no-
defaulters) for each time horizon and each static pool. The conditional marginal default 
rates are then weight-averaged to obtain the average conditional marginal default rates. 
Conditional default rates are calculated by finding the ratio between the number of 
defaulted issuers in a static pool at a specific time horizon and the number of issuers that 
did not default until that point in time. Weights are based on the number of issuers in 
each static pool. Cumulative default rates equal one minus the product of the proportion 
of survivors (non-defaulted issuers).  
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Although valid, this methodology focuses primarily on the stability of rating classes over 
time, demonstrating that public finance ratings are very stable, especially for the highest 
rated categories.  Across the analyzed sectors, the authors show the existence of an 
overall trend that “ratings and credit volatility increases at the lower end of the rating 
scale.” As one might intuitively expect, this study confirms that “the higher the rating the 
lower the historical average of default, and vice versa.” The obtained results show that 
over each time span, lower ratings are associated with higher default rates.  
 
3.2 The Cohort Approach 
 
An alternative approach for assessing default risk of municipal bonds has been utilized by 
Washburn et al. in their “Moody’s US Municipal Bond Rating Study” (2002). The 
database used for that study contains only issuers rated by Moody’s and spans the period 
1970 through 2000. The authors calculate default rates, as in a prior corporate bond 
default study, by taking a fraction in which the numerator represents the number of 
municipal debt issuers that defaulted on Moody’s-rated debt over a particular period of 
time and the denominator represents the number of municipal issuers that could have 
defaulted over that time period. As of January each year, the authors construct cohorts of 
all municipal issuers at each rating level. Further on, in order to calculate one- and multi-
year default rates, they track the subsequent incidence of default for issuers of each rating 
level and from each cohort on through to the end of the sample period.  
 
The default rates for Moody’s-rated municipal issuers calculated in this study prove to be 
quite low. The authors report that since 1970, the one-year, issuer-weighted average 
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annual default rate for all Moody’s-rated municipal bond issuers, regardless of their 
credit rating, is 0.0043%. When a differentiation is made between investment vs. 
speculative grade bonds, as one would expect, the investment grade sector demonstrates 
extremely low default rates, 0.0005%, while much higher default rates are observed in the 
speculative-grade sector (0.3914%). The authors argue that one explanation of the 
extremely low default rate among municipal issuers is the highly skewed distribution of 
ratings over that time period toward investment grade.  Over 90% of all initial municipal 
ratings in the analysis are investment grade, and nearly 70% are rated single A or higher.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that this cohort approach provides another tool for calculating 
default rates, the 2002 study analyzed only Moody’s-rated municipal bonds. The authors 
recognize that there is significant credit risk among many non-rated issuers and that while 
there were only 18 defaults on Moody’s-rated issuers between 1970 and 2000, that 
number was substantially higher for unrated issues during that same time horizon.  
 
The cohort approach has been applied in other empirical studies as well. Litvack and 
McDermott (2003) utilize the methodology in their municipal default risk study. In it they 
calculate default rates by analyzing the performance of bonds issued in a given year (a 
cohort) over time. Default rates are based on the dollar amount of defaulted par or 
number of defaulted issues compared to issuance volume during that period. Recognizing 
the fact that a large dollar default can skew the results if default is calculated based on 
dollar volume, as can a default by a single entity with a large number of outstanding 
issues (provided that default rate is assessed based on number of issues), the authors 
present default rates based on both methodologies where appropriate. The database they 
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use covers defaults that occurred from January 1, 1980 to October 31, 2002 and pertains 
to all types of municipal bonds issued in the U.S. over that period. Cumulative default 
rates are further calculated in their paper by industry sector.  
 
The study finds that overall default rate is low relative to many fixed-income sectors, 
with default rates varying substantially across municipal subsectors. It provides 
meaningful analysis of the default occurrence among both rated and non-rated municipal 
bonds but still applies a general approach and does not examine the default risk of non-
rated land secured municipal bonds. 
 
3.3 Default/mortality rate methodology 
 
Another approach for estimating the default rate of certain securities is Altman’s 
mortality rate concept. Altman (1989) argues that default rates for individual periods, 
annually, for example, are measured on the basis of defaults in the period compared to 
some base population in that same period. He bases his default estimates on both number 
of issues and dollar amount. In his study “Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and 
Performance”, he applies the methodology to a specific cohort group, such as a bond-
rating category and tracks that group’s performance over a period of time. However, his 
technique can easily be applied to a wider variety of securities. In fact, in Altman et al. 
(2000), he uses that same method to estimate the default rate on large, syndicated 
commercial loans, where he also aggregates all defaults into major rating categories. To 
account for the fact that the original population can undergo changes over time as a result 
of various events, Altman considers mortalities in relation to a survival population and 
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then inputs the defaults to calculate mortality rates. He calculates the marginal and 
cumulative mortality rates for the securities under investigation.  
 
The resulting mortality rate is “a value-weighted rate for the particular year after 
issuance, rather than an unweighted average.” This weighted-average technique correctly 
biases the results toward the larger-issue years, especially the more recent years, rather 
than improperly affecting the average, which would otherwise occur if, for example, the 
amount of new issues were very small as compared to high defaults in that same year. 
This is one of the differentiating features of Altman’s model versus other default models. 
 
Another major difference is the fact that this actuarial-based technique allows for the 
adjustment in the size of the original population as time goes by and some securities 
default, get called, mature, or are redeemed. The fact that a special group with particular 
original characteristics is tracked over relevant time periods after issuance allows to 
assess the aging effect as of the time of origination. This technique is consistent with 
actuarial theory but differs from the static and cohort approaches for estimating bond 
defaults discussed in the earlier sections, which measure default as of certain initial date 
regardless of the age of the bond. That is why the mortality rate methodology is often 
considered superior and will be used in this paper for calculating the default rate of the 
non-rated Mello-Roos bonds.  
 
In order to calculate the default rate on the sample of Mello-Roos bonds issued from 
1985 through 2004, we apply Altman’s mortality rate concept (see Altman 1989, for 
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example).  Default rates are based on dollar amount and number of issues13 where 
appropriate. The marginal mortality rate (MMR) for each year is obtained as follows: 
 
(t)year  ofstart  at the Bonds of Amount)(Dollar Number  Issue
(t)year in  Defaulting Bonds of Amount)(Dollar Number  Issue
)( =tMMR  
 
To calculate the cumulative mortality rate (CMR) over a specific period of time (such as 
1, 2, 3, …, T years) we subtract from one (1.0) the product of the surviving populations 








tT SRCMR  where =)(TCMR  Cumulative mortality rate in (T), and  
=)(tSR Survival rate in (t); )(1 tMMR− . 
 
We then compare the obtained mortality rates with the mortality rates for assessment 
district bonds as well as with other municipal bonds’ mortality rates over the same 
sample period.  
 
4 Sample Data 
 
It was extremely difficult to track the issuance and default information available for both 
AD and CFD bonds to be able to construct a complete data set, especially for the years 
prior to 1993. This was due to a number of reasons. First, some CFDs have been issued as 
part of Marks Roos pools under a specific, two-tier, structure. The first tier is at the 
authority level under which bonds are issued as revenue bonds, while the second tier is 
                                                 
13 Note that in this analysis, number of issues is assumed to be the same as number of issuers, since each 
bond issue represents a separate transaction and can thus be counted as a separate issuer.  
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comprised of all local obligations of the underlying CFDs that support those revenue 
bonds.  Given the structure, such issues are generally reported as revenue bonds under the 
issuing public financing authority (PFA) without any mention of the underlying CFDs at 
the local level. Only in certain circumstances were we able to separate the underlying 
CFD issues and include them in our data set. Another difficulty was presented by the fact 
that although rare, in some cases CFDs have been issued as private placements and 
information for them is not readily available. Last but not least, prior to 1993, the 
obligation for annual disclosure for CFD bonds was not easily enforceable and there 
might be a possibility that a few CFD issues that actually defaulted were not reported and 
were consequently excluded from the data set. However, those defaults, if uncured, 
would have been captured at a later date and would thus have ultimately been included in 
the data set. Furthermore, with the legislation enacted in 1992 (Chapter 772, Statutes of 
1992), all issuers of CFD bonds are required to report annually to the California Debt and 
Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) on the fiscal status of their bonds sold after 
January 1, 1993 until such bonds are retired, so we believe that the information we have 
collected is as extensive as possible, given the limitations previously described.   This, 
however, was not the case with AD bonds.  Compiling a default list for those bonds was 
extremely difficult due to the fact that there is no disclosure requirement associated with 
them like there is for Mello-Roos bonds. 
 
Thus, considerable effort on our part went into the composition of the sample data, which 
constitutes part of the originality of our research. The data sets we use have been 
compiled from a variety of sources: CDIAC, Fieldman, Rolapp & Associates, California 
Tax Data, Income Securities Advisors, Inc., Securities Data, the Bond Buyer, the 
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Municipal Bond Advisor, and numerous industry professionals such as trustee banks, 
underwriting and bond counsel firms, etc. They provide information on both aggregate 
bond issuance and default occurrences. Generally, the information received included 
issuer name, project name, issuance date, default date, principal amount, maturity date, 
Cusip number, CDIAC number, and other pertinent information, such as redemption or 
refunding date. In order to obtain the final data used for this study, we filter the compiled 
data sets on three different levels to eliminate duplicates and records that do not belong to 
the group of CFD or AD issues. Data is organized by calendar year.  
 
The issuance data set includes all CFDs and ADs whose issuance was reported to CDIAC 
and classified as Mello-Roos and Assessment District type of financing. Further, we 
include some issues that are part of revenue bond pooled financings but for which we 
have determined that they do in fact represent special tax obligations. Since those are at 
times hard to distinguish or are often only partially based on special taxes, our list 
includes only the ones that are clearly classifiable as CFD bonds.  
 
The default data is also grouped by calendar year. It has been examined as well to 
eliminate duplicates and possible misclassifications. Each defaulted transaction is 
counted only once, at the first time of default occurrence. Thus, if a bond issue defaulted 
three times, for example, it will be listed only once in our data set, at the first time of 
default. This is consistent with the methodology used in existing default studies.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, in applying Altman’s mortality rate methodology, 
we adjust the size of the original population as time goes by to account for bond calls, 
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maturities, redemptions and defaults. Since “good” CFD bonds (i.e., those for which 
projects are developed, built and occupied faster) are more creditworthy, they are able to 
be called and refunded as rated bonds. At that point they exit our sample of non-rated 
bonds. “Bad” CFD bonds (i.e. those whose projects do not get developed or experience 
many problems and take longer to get built and occupied) on the other hand, prove to be 
riskier and do not convert to rated bonds. They remain in our sample and thus, over time, 
among any issuing cohort, the fraction of “bad” bonds increases, which leads to higher 
default rates. Keeping that in mind, the default rate for non-rated land secured bonds 
might actually be lower than we show in that the number of non-rated land secured bonds 
is reduced over time14.  
 
5 Land Secured Bond Issuance: 1985-2004 
 
The issuance data we have compiled provides information on both number and dollar 
amount of CFD and AD bonds issued during the twenty-year period under investigation. 
The total number of CFDs issued in our sample is 1,230, while the total number of ADs 
issued is 2,307. Figure I illustrates the number and par amount of Mello-Roos bonds 
issued for the period 1985 through 2004, while Figure II illustrates the number and par 
amount of Assessment District bonds issued during the same period. 
 
                                                 
14 Thus, our study provides the most conservative approach on calculating non-rated land secured bond 
defaults (i.e., the worst case scenario) and as such might result in higher default rates for such bonds. 
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As can be seen from these figures, as well as from Figure III, AD bonds were issued in 
greater amounts and more often during the period 1985 through 1993 when Mello-Roos 
bonds were still new. However, starting in the early 1990’s the use of CFD bonds as a 
financing mechanism grew, especially after 1993 when state law changed and CDIAC’s 
annual reporting requirement was instituted. As a comparison, the AD bond transactions 
from 1985 through 1992 averaged 160 issues, while the average CFD bond issuance 
averaged only 40 transactions. However, over the next six years, from 1993 through 
1999, the issuance of CFD bonds increased by 51%, while AD issuance decreased by 
34% over the same period. 
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In spite of the difference in the average issuance between the Mello-Roos and 
Assessment District bonds, the mid to late 1980’s were a period in which the issuance of 
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land secured bonds was strong, as demonstrated by Figures I & II, and AD and CFD 
bonds were often used as a mechanism to fund public infrastructure. This was a period of 
strong economy and rapid development as illustrated by Figure IV. During that period the 
unemployment rate fell from its high of 7.2% in 1985 to 5.1% in 1989 and the number of 
employed increased by 14.4%. Furthermore, building permit issuance increased by 45% 
from 112,089 in 1985 to 162,981 in 1989. At the same time, the electronics and computer 
industries were growing stronger and California had become the leading state in terms of 
high technology industries.  
















































































Avg. Unemployment Rate in CA # of Building Permits
 
The economic outlook changed significantly, however, in 1990-1991. This was the 
beginning of a very deep recession for the state of California, which lasted through the 
mid 1990’s and it was only in 1996-1997 when the state started recovering.  That is why 
it is not surprising that there was a decline in the number of CFD and AD bonds issued 
during the first half of that decade, and especially in the mid 1990s. 
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In 1990 the collapse of the Berlin Wall signaled the end of the Cold War and defense 
spending in California decreased significantly. This led to considerable reductions in the 
state’s defense and aerospace industries, which resulted in numerous layoffs. In 1993 
major defense cuts were announced that further reduced procurement and led to massive 
military base closures. Consequently, there was a major downsizing of the state’s 
aerospace industry (Figure V). During the period 1990 through 1996, employment in the 
aircraft and parts, missiles and space vehicles, and search and navigation instruments 
sectors of the aerospace industry decreased by 48.9%, 65.8%, and 43.3%, respectively. 
Over the same period, the high technology industry comprised of the aerospace and 
electronics sectors experienced a decline of 26.2% (Figure VI). At the same time, to 
make matters worse, California was hit hard by a series of natural and self inflicted 
disasters, the Sierra Madre earthquake in Los Angeles County and the Oakland Hills fire 
in 1991, the earthquakes in Palm Springs, Ferndale, and Yucca Valley and the riots in 
South Central Los Angeles in 1992, as well as the Northridge earthquake in 1994. These 
factors resulted in a much longer and deeper recession than the rest of the United States 
(Figure VII). The rate of unemployment in California soared from 5.1% in 1989 to 9.5% 
in 1993 (an increase of 87.1%), while the unemployment rate in the U.S. as a whole 
increased by only 30.2%, from 5.3% in 1989 to 6.9% in 1993. The construction industry 
was severely impacted by these events. Total building permits in California in 1991 fell 
by 55.4% from their 1989 level. The drop in number of building permits issued was even 
larger in 1993, 64.4%, as compared to their 1989 level. It took a while for the state to 
recover from this recession but during the latter half of the 1990s, California’s economy 
grew faster. By 1999 the unemployment rate was down to 5.3% and in 2000 it decreased 
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further to 5.0%. The computer and electronics industry came out of recession and the 
construction industry, although slowly, started recovering as well. By 1999, building 
permits had grown by 65.5% as compared to their level in 1993. There was again a 
growing need of funding sources for the further development of numerous projects 
throughout the state. The issuance of Mello-Roos bonds was on the increase during this 
period. In 1999 the number of CFD bonds issued was double the one in 1992. That 
number grew further in the next few years and reached 119 CFD transactions in 2004.  
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6 The Default Occurrence of Mello-Roos and Assessment District 
Bonds: 1985-2004 
 
This section starts with a discussion of the characteristics of the major issuers of Mello-
Roos bonds in California: their agency type, geographic location, etc., as provided by 
CDIAC’s fiscal year status reports15. We then calculate marginal and cumulative default 
rates utilizing Altman’s mortality rate methodology for CFD, and subsequently, for AD 
bonds, and compare them with other municipal bonds’ default rates. 
 
6.1 Mello-Roos Bonds 
 
Of the CFD issues reported in CDIAC’s 2002 Yearly Fiscal Status Report (including 
information for FY 92/93 through FY 01/02, with data for FY 92/93 being for the second 
half of the fiscal year only), cities were the predominant issuer among the state and local 
agencies, with school districts being the second major issuer. Table 1 summarizes the 
CFD issuers based on agency type. There are ten agency types presented in the table with 
their share of bond issues listed as percentage of the total CFDs that were issued during 
the period of the second half of FY 92/93 through FY 01/02. Our further analysis of the 
default rate of the CFDs issued includes data samples that cover a more extensive time 
period (1985 through 2004) but issuance data by type of agency was available only for 
the ten fiscal years described above. 
 
 
                                                 





Table 1: CFD Issuers by Type of Agency 
Agency Type Percent of Total1 
City 51% 
School District 28% 
County 10% 
JPA 5% 
Water District 3% 
Redevelopment Agency 2% 
Special District 1% 
City/County 0% 
Community Services District 0% 
Utility District 0% 
Total 100% 
1 Totals may not add due to rounding. Percent equal to 
zero for last three categories due to rounding. 
 
For that same 10-year period, CFDs based in Southern California accounted for 54.2% of 
all bond issues included in that report. The most issues were reported by Riverside and 
Orange counties, 21.9% and 13.4%, respectively. The next five counties that reported the 
highest number of issues were San Bernardino (8.9%), San Diego (8.4%), Sacramento 
(7.0%), Los Angeles (7.0%), and San Joaquin (6.2%). Based on the additional data we 
collected from CDIAC and California Tax Data, out of all bond issues for FY 02/03, 
41.8% were issued by school districts, 37.3% by cities, 8.2% by water districts, 6.4% by 
counties, and the remaining 6.3% by community services districts, redevelopment 
agencies and public financing authorities. For FY 03/04 the predominant issuer were 
cities (50.0%), followed by school districts (28.6%), public financing authorities (7.1%) 
and water districts (5.4%).  
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Of the total number of 1,230 CFD deals issued from 1985 through 2004, 311 were either 
called or matured during that time, leaving 919 CFD issues outstanding for that period. 
Of those 919 issues outstanding, 27 defaulted by our terminal date, December 31, 2004 
(Table 3). Therefore, total defaults were 2.94% of those CFDs issued and not refunded or 
matured (Figure VIII) in terms of number of transactions. During the same period, the 
default rate in terms of par amount of the defaulted Mello-Roos bonds was 2.51% of the 
par amount of all CFD bonds issued (Figure IX).  














































































































































































































Par Amount of CFD Bonds Issued Par Amount of Defaulted CFD Bonds as % of Par Amount of CFD Bonds Issued
 
 
As a next step, using Altman’s mortality rate methodology, we have calculated the 
marginal and cumulative default rates for the entire population of CFD issues for the 
entire period from 1985 through 2004. The data in Table 2 show our mortality rate 
computations. The data include individual year and cumulative mortalities for up to 
twenty years after issuance16.   
 
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18 Y19 Y20
MMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.24 1.08 1.63 0.37 0.17 0.34 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00
CMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.36 0.36 1.95 2.19 3.24 4.82 5.17 5.33 5.65 5.65 5.78 5.78 5.78
Table 2 CFD Bonds Marginal and Cumulative Default Rates (%) (1985-2004)
 
 
                                                 
16 Marginal mortality rates are calculated as the ratio between the number of defaults in any given year and 
the number of issues outstanding in that year. 
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As can be seen from Table 2, CFDs had a zero mortality rate for the first six years after 
issuance, from 1985 through 1990. In 1991 there was one defaulted CFD transaction and 
then the next two years the mortality rate of CFD bonds was zero once again. The next 
nine years after issuance were the ones in which CFD mortalities ranged from a high of 
1.60% in 1994 and 1.63% in 1997 to a low of 0.14% in 2002 and no defaults reported in 
2001. There were no first-time defaults in the last two years of our sample. Thus, defaults 
were first observed starting in 1991, with the last default reported in 2002. Please refer to 
Table 3 for more details on the time of default occurrence. 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 TOTAL
No. of 
Defaults 0 1 0 0 6 1 5 8 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 27
Table 3: CFD Default Occurrence by Year
 
 
As previously described, we have considered default to be each event in which there was 
a missed payment of interest and/or principal to bond holders.  For each issue, default 
was counted only once, at the first time of occurrence. As can be seen from Table 3, 1997 
was the year with most defaults, with 1994 and 1996 being the years that were the next 
most predominant in terms of number of defaults. This is not surprising, since this was a 
clear result of the recession in California during the first half of that decade. In fact, a 
growing trend in defaults was observed overall in California during that period as 
illustrated by Figure X.  
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CaliforniaMunicipal Bond Issuance California Municipal Bond Defaults
 
 
In fact, CDIAC reports show that municipal defaults reached a high of nearly $215 
million in 1997. In its November 1997 issue, CDIAC argued that “this high level of 
defaults generally represents a lingering effect of the state’s recent severe economic 
recession, which caused real estate values to plummet and undermined the security for 
bonds issued by local agencies to finance infrastructure in real estate development 
projects.” While in 1990 none of the municipal defaults in California were comprised of 
CFD bond transactions, in 1994 Mello-Roos bonds accounted for 64%, in 1996 – for 
nearly 50%, and in 1997 for 42% of all municipal defaults in the state (Figure XI). As 
discussed earlier, the high level of CFD defaults during that period was due to the state’s 
prolonged real estate recession. Since Mello-Roos and other land secured bonds have 
debt service reserve funds, capitalized interest accounts and other sources of liquidity as 
described in the earlier sections of this paper, their performance tends to lag the market as 
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those cushions can delay a bond default for a period of time.17 Thus, land secured bond 
defaults are often characterized as a lagging economic indicator of the real estate market. 
This explains the fact that even though California’s market had stabilized by 1997, CFD 
defaults were most pronounced in that year and around that time in general.  
 
As illustrated in Figure X, however, in 2001 and especially in 2003, there was another 
peak in California municipal bond defaults. These can be viewed as direct consequence 
of “the significant changes in the economic and geopolitical landscape since 1999 – a 
protracted recession, war, increased threat of terrorism, and fear of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)”, which led to “revenue reductions, budget deficits, 
reduced general reserves, and therefore, an erosion in municipal credit” (Litvack et al. 
2003).  None of those defaults, however, were comprised of Mello-Roos bonds. In 2003 
and 2004 there were no CFD defaults observed in the market place. This can be explained 
by the fact that although the tragedy of September 11, 2001, further terrorist activities, 
and the mild recession which began in mid-2001 affected the economy of California 
causing the state to experience a decline in traffic within new home projects immediately 
after the September attacks, sales volumes relatively quickly returned to previous levels, 
primarily driven by excess demand (stimulated by the historically low interest rates) and 
not sufficient supply, and in 2004 appeared to be strong.  
                                                 
17 Usually for about 3 years. See Altman and Kishore (1995), for example. 
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California Municipal Bond Defaults Par Amount of CFD Defaulted as % of Bonds Issued
 
 
6.2 Assessment District Bonds 
 
As presented in the previous section, during the period 1985-2004, the municipal bond 
market in California experienced numerous events of default. The total par amount of all 
bonds issued during that period amounted to nearly $517 billion, of which the par amount 
of the defaulted bonds was $1.6 billion. Thus, for the California municipal bond market 
overall, the average rate of default was around 0.30%. Out of the $1.6 billion defaulted 
par amount, the par amount of defaulted CFD bonds accounted for $369 million, or 
23.7%.  
 
In this section, we analyze the default experience of Assessment District bonds over the 
same time period. Of the total number of 2,307 Assessment District bonds issued from 
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1985 through 2004, 518 were either called or matured during that time, leaving 1,789 AD 
deals outstanding for that period. Of those 1,789 deals outstanding, 31 defaulted by our 
terminal date, December 31, 2004 (Table 4). Therefore, total defaults were 1.73% of 
those ADs issued and not refunded or matured (Figure XII) in terms of number of 
transactions. During the same period, the aggregate default rate in terms of par amount of 
the defaulted Assessment District bonds was 1.96% of the par amount of all AD bonds 
issued (Figure XIII). When compared to the $1.6 billion defaulted par amount of all 
municipal bonds in the state, the par amount of defaulted AD bonds accounted for $244 
million, or 15.3%.  
 
As can be seen from Table 4 and from Figures XII and XIII, 1994 and 1996 were the two 
years with most Assessment District bonds defaults, five, followed by  1997 and 1999, 
with four defaults occurring in each of those years. Overall, AD bond defaults occurred 
mostly during the period 1992 through 2000, with 28 out of the 31 total defaults, or more 
than 90% of all AD bond defaults, occurring during that period.  These results are not 
surprising given the recession during the first half of the 1990s. In addition, the fact that 
Assessment District bonds, like Mello-Roos bonds, are a lagging economic indicator of 
the real estate market explains the default occurrence during the second half of the 1990s 
and is consistent with CDIAC’s reports of peaks in the overall default occurrence of 
California municipal bond defaults during that period, and,  especially, in 1997. While in 
1990, none of the state’s municipal bond defaults were comprised of CFD bonds, 11.2% 
of all defaults in that year were due to AD bond defaults. Furthermore, most of the state’s 
municipal defaults during the period 1994-1999, were comprised of CFD and AD bond 
defaults. As discussed earlier, CFD bonds accounted for 64%, nearly 50%, and 42% of all 
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municipal defaults in 1994, 1996, and 1997, respectively. Meanwhile, in 1994 AD bonds 
accounted for over 40%, in 1995 – for nearly 74%, in 1996 – for 38%, and in 1997 – for 
nearly 37% of the defaults observed (Figure XIV), which, combined with the CFD 
defaults for the same period, accounts for almost all municipal bond defaults in the state 
in that period. 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 TOTAL
No. of 
Defaults 1 0 3 0 5 3 5 4 1 4 3 1 1 0 0 31
Table 4: AD Default Occurrence by Year
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As a next step, using Altman’s mortality rate methodology, we have calculated 
Assessment District bonds’ marginal and cumulative mortality rates (Table 5). As can be 
seen from the table, much like CFD bonds, ADs had a zero mortality rate for the first five 
years after issuance, from 1985 through 1999.  While there were no CFD defaults in 
1990, there was one AD default in that year, resulting in a mortality rate of 0.10%. 1994 
through 2002 was the period in which AD mortality rates ranged from a high of 0.34% in 
1994 and 0.31% in 1996 to a low of 0.06% in 2001 and 2002 and no defaults reported in 
2003 and 2004. The cumulative default rate for the twenty-year period amounted to 2%, 
which is less than half the cumulative default rate of CFD bonds over the same period. 
  
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18 Y19 Y20
MMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.34 0.20 0.31 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00
CMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.34 0.34 0.68 0.88 1.19 1.43 1.49 1.72 1.88 1.94 2.00 2.00 2.00
Table 5 AD Bonds Marginal and Cumulative Default Rates (%) (1985-2004)
 
 
As illustrated earlier in Figure II and Figure III, AD bonds were often issued in small 
sizes. This might be due to the fact that the special assessment levy is only based on 
direct benefit (individual projects) and not on master plan situations. Hence, it might be 
appropriate to restrict our sample and include only issues larger than $1,500,000 and see 
how the default rate changes as a result of that restriction. 
 
If we consider only AD bonds with par size equal to or greater than $1,500,000, then our 
sample decreases to 1,302 bond issues, out of which 311 bonds either matured or were 
called during the 1985-2004 period. Thus, the total number of outstanding AD bonds for 
that period is 991, out of which 25 deals defaulted by our terminal date, December 31, 
2004. Therefore, the aggregate default rate for our restricted sample of ADs (considering 
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only the ones issued and not refunded or matured) is 2.52%, which is 0.81% higher than 
the 1.73% we had before for the unrestricted sample. The AD bonds’ cumulative default 
rate over the entire 20-year period is now 2.84% (Table 6), which represents an almost 
30% increase in the cumulative mortality rate of the unrestricted AD bonds’ sample.  
 
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18 Y19 Y20
MMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.62 0.35 0.44 0.42 0.10 0.28 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
CMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.50 0.50 1.11 1.46 1.89 2.30 2.40 2.68 2.76 2.76 2.84 2.84 2.84
Table 6 AD Bonds Marginal and Cumulative Default Rates (%) (1985-2004)
 
 
If we were to analyze the performance of the non-rated land secured market as a whole 
(as comprised of CFD and AD Bonds), we would see that for the 1985 through 2004 
period, there were a total of 3,537 bond issuances, of which 829 were either called or 
refunded prior to December 31, 2004, leaving 2,708 deals outstanding for the period 
under investigation. Out of those 2,708 outstanding deals, 58 defaulted before the 
termination date of our study, resulting in an aggregate default rate of 2.14%. Estimated 
marginal mortality rates vary from a high of 0.60% in 1994, to 0.56% in 1997 and 0.49% 
in 1996, respectively, to a low of 0.04% in 2001 and ultimately, 0.00% in 2003 and 2004 
(Table 7).  
 
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18 Y19 Y20
MMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.60 0.21 0.49 0.56 0.13 0.22 0.21 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00
CMR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.35 0.35 0.95 1.15 1.63 2.18 2.31 2.52 2.73 2.77 2.85 2.85 2.85
Table 7 Non-Rated Land Secured Market Marginal and Cumulative Default Rates (%) (1985-2004)
 
 
As can be seen from Table 7, the mortality rate of the non-rated land secured market in 
California as comprised of the CFD and the AD bonds issued is not that high. The 
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cumulative default rate for that market over the entire 20-year period is 2.85%. To be 
able to assess this rate, as well as the CFD and AD default rates, however, we need a 
benchmark against which to compare and be able to evaluate the default experience of 
these bonds. In the next section we examine the performance of the U.S. municipal 
market and compare it to the performance of the California non-rated land secured 
market. 
 
7 The Default Experience of the U.S. Municipal Market 
 
There have been numerous studies on the default experience of the U.S. rated municipal 
market18 but they either cover a different time period, or use a different methodology in 
calculating the default rate of the analyzed securities. The only study that seems 
somewhat comparable to ours is Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) “U.S. Municipal Rating 
Transitions and Defaults, 1986-2003”, published in April 2004. This study covers a 
similar time span and examines credit types such as general obligation (GO), 
lease/appropriation/moral obligation, special tax (sales, gas, etc.), special district, water 
and sewer revenue, public power, airports, ports, toll roads and bridges, parking, various 
types of bond pools, transit, public and private higher education, auxiliary higher 
education debt, independent schools, hospitals (stand alone and systems), continuing 
care, and physicians’ practices.  
 
                                                 
18 See for instance “Municipal Default Risk” (Fitch IBCA, 1999); “Municipal Default Risk Revisited” 
(Fitch Ratings, 2003); “Moody’s US Municipal Bond Rating Scale” (Moody’s Investors Service, 2002); 
etc. 
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S&P conducts its default study on the basis of the static pool methodology, where a static 
pool is formed on the first day of each year examined in the study and followed from that 
point on. All ratings included in the study are grouped into these pools and are followed 
year-to-year within each pool. S&P describes that “for example, the 1986 static pool 
comprises all parity debt outstanding as of January 1, 1986. The 1987 static pool was 
formed by adding new parity ratings first rated in 1986 to the still outstanding ratings of 
the 1986 static pool and subtracting those ratings that defaulted or were set to non-rated.” 
The study then presents the annual default rates calculated for each static pool and the 
estimated cumulative default rates that average the experience of all static pools. In 
obtaining the cumulative default rate estimates, the authors first calculate “marginal 
default rates, conditional on survival (survivors being non-defaulters) for each possible 
time horizon and for each static pool; weight averaging the conditional marginal default 
rates, and accumulating the average conditional marginal default rates.” Cumulative 
default rates are then equal to one minus the product of the proportion of survivors (non-
defaulters). 
 
To avoid the risks of magnitude skewing results, S&P’s study is based on individual 
issuances, rather than on dollar amounts. The study’s cumulative default analysis tracks 
the historical average of default of a rated obligation at any point in time during its life. 
The obtained results indicate that the number of defaults and cumulative default rates for 
S&P public debt are extremely low, with no defaults reported in the ‘AAA’ or ‘AA’ rated 
categories for the period 1986-2003. The cumulative default analysis further indicates 
that the chance of default on both an ‘A’ and ‘BBB’ rated debt is less than 1% over an 
18-year horizon and that “it is only at the speculative-grade level that the cumulative 
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default rate becomes significant.” At the ‘BB’ level, 1% of the average pool has defaulted 
by the third year; at the ‘B’ level, 2.1% of the typical pool defaulted within the first year 
(refer to Table 8). Figure XV illustrates the default experience of ‘BBB’, ‘BB’, ‘B’, 
‘CCC/C’ rated debt, as well as of investment-grade and speculative-grade level debt.  
































BBB Rated BB-Rated B Rated CCC / C Rated Investment Grade Speculative Grade
 
 
Although the study provides a good analysis of the overall rated market, it admits that 
“limited light can be derived” from it “with respect to the credit performance of 
speculative-grade public finance debt due to the sparse rating coverage of the below-
investment-grade sector.” S&P argues that it believes the default experience in the 
unrated market to be meaningfully higher than reflected in the investment-grade-rated 
market but does not undertake to determine how much higher its default is. 
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Rating Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18
AAA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
BBB 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
BB 0.29 0.70 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.46
B 2.14 4.40 5.20 5.63 6.52 7.47 8.48 9.04 9.65 9.65 9.65 9.65 9.65 9.65 9.65 9.65 9.65 9.65
CCC/C 11.94 15.87 19.24 22.79 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78 23.78
Inv. Grade 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Spec. Grade 1.72 2.82 3.61 4.12 4.39 4.58 4.78 4.90 5.02 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15
All Rated 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Table 8 Cumulative Default Rates (%) (1985-2003)
 
 
Keeping in mind the different methodologies for analyzing the default performance of the 
bonds in our and S&P’s study, there is no direct and straightforward comparison between 
the cumulative default rates in Table 8 and the cumulative default rates we calculated for 
the CFD bonds. However, as can be seen from Table 8, the one year cumulative default 
rate of AA rated bonds is zero percent, which compares to the default rate for the Mello-
Roos bonds in the first few years of our sample. In the next few years their cumulative 
default rates were in the range of the default rates of the BBB and BB rated bonds19. The 
performance of the restricted sample of AD bonds was similar to that of AA rated bonds 
for the first five years, while for the next two years it was between that of BBB rated and 
BB rated bonds. In the next two years the default rates of the restricted sample of AD 
bonds were between the default rates for BB rated and B rated bonds, while in the last 
few years they were closer to those for B rated bonds. Comparable was the performance 
of the unrestricted sample of AD bonds. Their cumulative default rates initially were 
lower than those for BBB rated bonds, while in the later years of our sample they started 
                                                 
19 This implies that the non-rated Mello-Roos bonds are, in the long run, riskier than BBB-rated municipal 
bonds. Thus, one would expect that the yields on the non-rated Mello-Roos bonds are higher than the ones 
for BBB-rated municipal bonds. In order to determine if that is the case, we have compared the 30-year 
yield on a sample of non-rated CFD bonds issued during the period 1998-2004 to the 30-year yield on 
BBB-rated municipal bonds. Appendix C illustrates that relationship. As expected, due to the higher risk 
they bear, non-rated CFD bonds carry yields that exceed the yields on BBB-rated municipal bonds. 
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approaching the default rates for BB rated bonds and then began to behave closer to B 
rated bonds but still remaining lower than the default rates for those bonds. 
 
If we were to summarize and compare the performance of the entire non-rated land 
secured market in California over the 1985-2003 period (as comprised of the CFD and 
AD bonds), we see that for the first five years, it behaves like AA rated bonds, then that 
market’s default experience becomes comparable to the default experience of BB rated 
bonds, and in the last few years under investigation, its default rates seem to be more like 
those for bonds between the BB and B rated categories and below the B rated category. 
Hence, if we were to assess the credit quality of the California non-rated land secured 
market on average, it seems to be comparable to bonds of rating class between the BB 




As discussed in the earlier sections, the default of a CFD or an AD bond issue is defined 
as the first missed payment of interest or principal due on the bonds. This occurs as a 
result of a delinquency in the payment of the special taxes or special assessments levied 
on the property securing the bonds. In such instances, pursuant to Section 53356.1 of the 
Mello-Roos Act, the district may pursue judicial foreclosure action to foreclose the lien. 
In such an action, the real property subject to the unpaid special tax (or assessment) may 
be sold at a judicial foreclosure sale in an attempt to obtain funds to pay the special taxes 
that support the payment of the debt service on the bonds. However, if the amount of 
special tax (special assessment) delinquency on a particular parcel is so small that the 
 63
cost of foreclosure proceedings will far exceed the amount of such delinquency, the 
district may delay foreclosure proceedings until there are sufficient special tax 
(assessment) delinquencies accruing to such parcel (including interest and penalties 
thereon) to warrant the cost of foreclosure proceedings. A covenant for foreclosure is 
included in the offering documents of every CFD or AD bond issue. It allows for the 
trading of the bonds in the secondary market even though interest and principal are not 
being paid at the time of default. A foreclosure sale in such case is an attempt to stimulate 
transfer of ownership in the underlying collateral to a new party that will assume the 
responsibility of paying the special taxes (assessments) and thus the bonds will be 
brought current.  
 
When a bond issue defaults, the bonds still remain outstanding and accrue interest. 
However, there is no acceleration of the lien in the event of default. An investor who 
owns bonds of a defaulted issue in most instances can still sell them. However, the 
realized non-payment on the bonds will negatively affect their price20 and that investor 
will only be able to receive at best twenty or thirty cents on the dollar. If a successful 
foreclosure sale occurs to a third party, however, the special taxes (assessments) are 
brought current, the default is cured and the price of the bonds goes up. 
 
Foreclosure sales are not always successful and it might take a long time for a defaulted 
bond issue to be cured. In this section of the essay we attempt to determine what the 
                                                 
20 Issuers of CFD and AD bonds have continuing disclosure obligations and the obligation to report 
material events, such as defaults, in order to effectuate a transparent market where buyers and sellers know 
what they are buying.  
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recovery of the defaulted CFD and AD bonds in our sample has been, even though 
recovery data is not systematic, which makes this analysis difficult.   
 
It was a challenge to determine the recovery values of the sample of defaulted CFD and 
AD bonds, keeping in mind the scarcity of information, the long history of some of the 
defaults and the limited secondary market trading that occurs. In order to obtain recovery 
data, we utilized a number of sources such as discussions with investment bankers and 
municipal bond attorneys specializing in workouts and settlements, as well as the 
Municipal Bond Advisor’s publications. For some of the issues in our sample we were 
able to confirm that a full recovery occurred, while for others the likelihood of this 
happening was very strong. Other issues made only partial payment to bond holders and 
even though those traded relatively rarely, we assumed that the prices at which they could 
be found were a good estimate of the price floor for those issues. This was a reasonable 
assumption given the much higher potential for recovery in case of a workout or 
settlement with new potential developers. In a few rare cases we found that bonds were 
either valued at zero or at a discount because they were very deep in default or investors 
preferred to sell them below par just to get some of their initial investment back. Overall, 
our analysis of the 58 defaulted Mello-Roos and Assessment District bonds resulted in a 
recovery rate of 58%, calculated on a dollar-weighted average basis. This compares 
favorably with the recovery rates of rated municipal and corporate bonds. In its “US 
Municipal Bond Rating Scale” (2002) study, Moody’s reports that “the average 
municipal bond recovery is 66% of par as compared to 42% of par for corporate bonds. 
Fitch confirms these results in its “Municipal Default Risk Revisited” (2003) report, 
showing that “defaulted municipal bonds have relatively high recovery rates (about 
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67%)” when valued based on dollar-weighted average. This study further shows that the 
dollar-weighted recovery rate of general purpose bonds (including certificates of 
participation and assessment districts’ defaults) is 90.27%, with recovery rates on general 
obligation bonds being at 100%. In most cases, CFD and AD bonds’ defaults ultimately 





The results we have obtained in this paper indicate that Mello-Roos and Assessment 
District bonds sold in the municipal bond market bear risk that is not as high as 
previously expected. Their default rates over the 1985-2004 period average 2.94% and 
1.73% in terms of number of issues for CFD and AD bonds, respectively (2.52% for the 
restricted sample of AD bonds), and 2.14% for the California non-rated land secured 
market as a whole (as comprised of AD and CFD bonds), with a dollar-weighted average 
recovery rate of 58%. The twentieth-year cumulative mortality rates are 5.78%, 2.0% 
(2.84%), and 2.85% for the CFD bonds, AD bonds (restricted sample of AD bonds) and 
the entire California non-rated land secured market, respectively. These default rates are 
above the overall default rate for the U.S. municipal bond market, which is primarily 
comprised of investment grade issues, but are comparable to BB and B rated municipal 
bonds by Standard & Poor’s. The implications are that the credit quality of Mello-Roos 
bonds is much better than what the perception was in the industry for a long time. This 
means that another look should be taken at the way such bonds are valued and the means 
of determining their actual credit risk to reflect that such bonds bear moderate likelihood 
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of default. Furthermore, an additional consideration should be given to the improved 
mechanism for issuance of CFD bonds and the annual reporting of their fiscal status. 
Moreover, the recent trend of demanding additional forms of security for the bonds is 
another factor that makes default a less likely occurrence.   The data in our study show 
that there are no new defaults of CFD and AD bonds in the past few years. As the 
economy recovers, as reflected by an increase in employment, a growing number of 
building permits issued, the improvement of other macroeconomic indices, and the 
increasing land values, we expect that this trend of low or zero default to continue, 
resulting in a further stabilization of the credit quality of the California non-rated land 
secured market (as comprised by Mello-Roos and Assessment District bonds). 
 
 
Usual Sequence of Events
for Mello Roos
Community Facilities Districts
REQUIRED -- Publish notice
(not later than 7 days before
Public Hearing)
OPTION -- Mailed notice
(not later than 15 days before
Public Hearing)
May be continued up to 30 days, or with finding up to 6 months.
PETITION INITIATED CFD
1.  10% Landowners
2.  10% Registered voters











(Commencing with Section 53311
of the Government Code)
If no majority protest, resolutions adopted to form CFD* by:
1.  Establishing boundaries
2.  Determining necessity to incur bonded indebtedness
3.  Authorizing levy of special tax
4.  Approving types of facilities and services
5.  Setting election
If more than 50% of registered voters (at least 6), or if the
owners of more than 50% of the land area protest, then
CFD abandoned for one year.  If majority protest only
against specific facilities, services or special tax,
only that facility, service or tax must be dropped.
* Environmental review should be completed before formation of CFD
LEGISLATIVE BODY
COMMENCES PROCEEDINGS
1.  Adopt Goals and Policies
2.  Adopt resolutions to:
a.  Approve boundaries
b.  Designate name of CFD
c.  Identify types of facilities &
services
d.  Declare Intention to:
1)  Form CFD
2)  Levy special tax
3)  Issue bonds
e.  Set time and place of
public hearing
f.  Establish voting procedures   
Within 90 days
Prepare Report
Public hearing held not
less than 30 days or




LOCAL AGENCY INITIATED CFD
1.  Written request of 2
members of legislative
body, or
2.  Majority approval of
legislative body
1.  Record Notice of Special Tax Lien
2.  Initiate validation proceedings, if necessary
3.  30 day statute of limitations
ACTIONS BY LEGISLATIVE BODY
1.  Certify election results
2.  Enact ordinance to levy
special tax
3.  Authorize issuance of bonds
4.  Approve Preliminary Official
Statement and Continuing
Disclosure Agreement
GENERAL ELECTION or SPECIAL ELECTION
90/180 days from Resolution of Formation
(unless time period shortened by 100% of electors)
2/3 vote required
(if less than 12 registered voters




1.  Levy of Special Tax
2.  Establish appropriations limit
3.  Authorize issuance of bonds
1.  Sell and deliver bonds and
receive bond proceeds
2.  Initiate construction or
acquisition
3.  Commence activities to
administer debt, levy and




Source: Fieldman, Rolapp & Associates 
APPENDIX B 
Overview of Community Facilities Districts (“CFDs”) vs. Assessment Districts (“ADs”) 
 
ISSUE COMMUNITY FACILITIES DISTRICT 
1913-1915 ACT  
ASSESSMENT DISTRICT 
1. Eligible Assets All public improvements with a useful life of five years or more. Public improvements which provide local special benefit to parcels within an AD. 
2. Eligible Services 
Authorized for certain types of public services, including police, fire, 
library, recreational, flood control and maintenance of parks, parkways and 
open space (certain services require registered voter approval). 
Authorized only to fund operations and maintenance of facilities 
directly financed by an AD. 
3. Apportionment of 
Assessments/ Special 
Taxes 
Special tax is not a special “assessment” and there is no requirement that 
the tax be apportioned on the basis of benefit to any property.  However, a 
special tax levied pursuant to the Mello-Roos Act may be based on a 
benefit received by parcels of real property, the cost of making facilities or 
authorized services available to each parcel, or some other “reasonable” 
basis as determined by the legislative body. 
No assessment may be imposed on any parcel that exceeds the 
reasonable cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on 
that parcel.  Only special benefits are assessable, and an agency 
must separate the general benefits from the special benefits 
conferred on a parcel. 
4. Financing District 
Boundaries 
May be expanded through future annexations to include other properties 
that might benefit from CFD facilities or services. 
AD boundaries are generally fixed once assessments are 
confirmed. 
5. Formation Process 
Notice, public hearing, majority protest process and 2/3 vote required.  
Landowner election if less than 12 registered voters or if a tax is not 
imposed on residential property. 
Notice, public hearing, majority protest process.  Majority 
protest exists if ballots submitted in opposition to the 
assessment exceed ballots submitted in favor.  Ballots weighed 
according to proportional financial obligation of the affected 
property. 
6. Maximum Residential 
Property Tax as 
Percentage of Sales Price 
No statutory limit, but generally limited by public agency policy to a 
percentage of projected (not actual) property values. No statutory limit, based solely on special benefit. 
7. Homeowner Property Tax 
Bills 
Special taxes can be levied each year up to maximum rates, regardless of 
outstanding debt service and maintenance cost requirements.  The 
maximum special taxes for parcels used for private residential uses cannot 
be increase by more than 2% per year.  In addition parcels used for private 
residential uses cannot be increased by more than 10% to cover 
delinquencies caused by others. 
Assessments can only be levied for existing debt service, 
maintenance costs, and pre-approved administrative charges. 
Source: Fieldman, Rolapp & Associates 
APPENDIX B (CONTINUED) 
 
ISSUE COMMUNITY FACILITIES DISTRICT 
1913-1915 ACT  
ASSESSMENT DISTRICT 
8. Public Property No special tax required, so generally not taxed. 
Must be assessed based on special benefit, so it generally results 
in an upfront cash payment/contribution to offset any 
assessment levy. 
9. Land Use Changes 
Special taxes are automatically apportioned based on a tax formula 
(referred to as a “Rate and Method of Apportionment”), which generally 
adapts to changes in land use that occur after formation of the CFD. 
Assessment lien apportionments cannot easily be modified after 
formation of an AD, except for subdivision of existing parcels 
generally based on lot sizes or numbers of units in each 
subdivided lot. 
10. Cross Collateralization & 
Debt Service Coverage 
Parcels are generally cross collateralized, overall CFD provides 110% (or 
greater) debt service coverage.  Therefore, delinquencies on certain parcels 
may require that special taxes be raised on other properties (up to 
maximums provided). 
No cross collateralization of parcels, each parcel in AD limited 
to its proportional share of 100% debt service coverage. 
11. Pay-as-you-go financing 
of infrastructure 
Yes. No. 
12. Pay-off or Prepayment of 
Lien 
Allowed if included in the Rate and Method of Apportionment, but require 
complicated formula to administer – usually not financially efficient. 
Automatically allowed by State statute, simpler to administer 
than in CFD. 
13. Public Agency Financing 
Guidelines 
Must be adopted by agency prior to initiation of proceedings to establish a 
CFD. None required by law.  Often imposed as policy matter. 
14. Acceptance by Public 
Widespread use since 1996 (particularly by school districts and since Prop 
218) and a strong economy have made CFDs more acceptable to 
homebuyers.  CFDs historically had a poor reputation with many political 
bodies and homebuyers. 
ADs are more politically acceptable in many communities. 
15. Assessment/ Taxation of 
Undeveloped Property 
Special Taxes on undeveloped land can differ from Special Taxes on 
developed properties. 
Assessments on undeveloped land are often based on their 
potential development, and are generally equivalent to 
assessments on similar properties in their “post development” 
state. 
16. Debt Service Structure Usually either level debt service or increasing debt service of 2% per year. Usually level debt service. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CFD – Community Facilities District 
IPOs – Initial Public Offerings 
S&P – Standard & Poor’s 
AD – Assessment District 
RMA – Rate and Method of Apportionment 
DSRF – Debt Service Reserve Fund 
LOC – Letter of Credit 
ROI – Resolution of Issuance 
MMR – Marginal Mortality Rate 
CMR – Cumulative Mortality Rate 
SR – Survival Rate 
PFA – Public Financing Authority 
CDIAC – California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission 
CUSIP – Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures 
NASDAQ – National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
System 
FY – Fiscal Year 
JPA – Joint Powers Authority 
SARS – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
















This paper translates a real life example of a defaulted community facilities 
district (CFD) into a simple model of the strategic behavior and interaction 
among the participants in the district and explores in game-theoretic terms 
the situation of curing partial default, which might often create a potentially 
conflict situation for the participants in such CFD. The results we arrive at 
are quite intuitive. There are three types of Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibria, each of which is the result of a cost-benefit analysis performed 
by the players. Ultimately, in all equilibria the decision is made based on 
each player’s expected gains as compared to the expected decision of the 






Keywords: partial default, community facilities district, CFD, equilibria 












Since 1985, more than $13.6 billion in Mello-Roos special tax bonds have been issued by 
local governments in California.  The asset securing these bonds is land, or more 
precisely, they are secured by “liens on specified parcels of real property within a defined 
area” (the community facilities district, or the CFD), and are “neither general obligations 
of municipal issuers nor personal debts of property owners1”.  
 
Most of these bonds are issued to finance the construction or acquisition of infrastructure 
in real estate development projects. Examples of the construction of public improvements 
funded through these bonds include roads, schools, freeway interchanges, sewage 
treatment plants, etc. Since the ultimate security for bondholders at the time of initial 
issuance of these municipal securities is the value of the raw, undeveloped land in the 
CFD, such bonds are often referred to as “dirt bonds”.  
 
Even though the issuance of Mello-Roos bonds enhances development by allowing 
public facilities in developing areas to be installed quickly, it poses the risk that because 
these bonds are backed by tax revenues paid from the income of the taxpayers within 
each CFD, at some point, if the debt burden reaches excessive levels, taxpayers may 
become unable or unwilling to pay. That might be the case also if the project construction 
and sales do not proceed according to plan, under which circumstances the landowner 
                                                 
1 CDIAC Disclosure Guidelines for Land-based Securities, September 12, 1996. 
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may be unable to meet scheduled debt service payments. In such instances, the Mello-
Roos Act pursuant to which such bonds are issued provides for judicial foreclosure at the 
option of the governmental issuer to remedy delinquencies of special tax payments. 
 
Real estate development is typically comprised of two stages: land development and 
building construction. During the land development stage, the site is acquired and graded, 
infrastructure is installed, and all other activities pertaining to the conversion of raw land 
into improved building lots are conducted. During the second state, residential, 
commercial and industrial structures are constructed for sale to end users. Often times 
these two phases are not carried out by the same real estate developers. It is very common 
for a group of developers to improve raw land and then sell it to merchant builders who, 
under the best case scenario, contract with clients to construct residential units, or simply 
build such units on their own, taking the risk that there will be buyers for their product 
upon completion.  
 
Most Mello-Roos bonds are issued during the first stage of raw land when there is high 
concentration of property in the hands of only one or few developers. This is the stage 
with highest credit risk, since then those property owners are responsible for all or the 
majority of the special taxes levied on the property in order to pay the debt service on the 
bonds. Under such circumstances, if these majority property owners are delinquent in 
their special tax payments, the reserve fund on the bonds can be depleted2 and a bond 
default may occur3. A developer may be delinquent on its special tax payments for a 
                                                 
2 Draws on the reserve fund to cover any delinquencies are often referred to as technical default. 
3 Default is defined as missed payment of principal of or interest on the bonds.  
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number of reasons, the most likely ones being that contrary to expectations, demand for 
its completed product does not materialize, or that the project ultimately does not 
generate the expected revenues, or costs more than anticipated4. 
 
In some cases, actual default can be avoided if property values in the CFD are adequate5. 
In such cases, delinquencies do not lead to investment losses to bondholders because 
foreclosure sales should be able to generate sufficient proceeds to pay delinquent 
principal and interest plus penalties. However, during the early stages of development, 
land values are highly volatile, which can undermine the accuracy of appraisals prepared 
for undeveloped property. In such cases, especially if the real estate market is 
experiencing a slump, foreclosure sales might fail to generate minimum acceptable bids, 
resulting in investment losses to bondholders. Even if land values were adequate, the 
judicial foreclosure process often takes a long time, which might possibly result in a non-
payment of debt service. Furthermore, if a developer files for bankruptcy, the action can 
take much longer.  
 
Any Resolution authorizing the issuance of Mello-Roos bonds typically includes a 
covenant that requires the issuing agency to initiate judicial foreclosure proceedings 
under specified circumstances and within a specified time period (which vary among 
issuers) after special tax payments have become delinquent. To order, commence and 
                                                 
4 Learning from past experience and acknowledging the intricacies of curing partial defaults, a new trend 
has emerged in recent years in an attempt to reduce the risk of default. That trend is to issue bonds for a 
particular CFD when the property is owned by merchant builders who are in the building construction stage 
of the project as opposed to developers who are still in the land development stage. 
5 Or if the value-to-lien ratio as measured by the value of the land and improvements in the district relative 
to the amount of tax-supported debt secured by liens on property in the district is significantly high. State 
law has established a minimum 3:1 value-to-lien requirement for Mello-Roos special tax bond issues. 
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diligently prosecute to judgment an action in the superior court to foreclose the lien of 
any special tax or installment of special tax, the agency must file a lawsuit in the Superior 
Court to request a judgment to foreclose on the delinquent lien. Upon receiving a 
judgment, the property may be sold at a foreclosure sale. The minimum bid at that sale 
must be equal to the amount of the delinquency, plus penalties, interest, court costs and 
attorneys’ fees. The foreclosure action may collect only these amounts; there is no 
acceleration of the lien. Amounts recovered in the action in excess of what is needed to 
replenish the reserve fund are used to extinguish any other liens on the property. 
 
The exact timing and amounts vary depending on the provisions of the Indenture (or 
Fiscal Agent Agreement) of a particular CFD but, for instance, a district may covenant 
for the benefits of the owners of the bonds that it will commence foreclosure proceedings 
within 150 days of each August 15 against parcels as to which there is an aggregate 
special tax delinquency of more than $10,000 and will commence foreclosure 
proceedings against all parcels with delinquent special tax installments within 150 days 
of August 15 of each bond year in which the district receives special tax proceeds in an 
amount less than 95% of the amount needed to pay that year’s principal of and interest on 
the bonds, and will cause such foreclosure actions to be diligently pursued to completion. 
However, the district also may elect to defer foreclosure proceedings on any parcel if the 
amount in the reserve fund is not less than the reserve requirement6.  If a judicial 
foreclosure sale were to occur, there is no assurance that the real property subject to that 
sale will be sold or if sold, that the proceeds of such sale will be sufficient to pay the 
                                                 
6 Calculated as the lesser of three tests, i.e. the lesser of (i) 10% of the outstanding principal amount of the 
bonds, (ii) maximum annual debt service on the outstanding bonds, or (iii) 125% of average annual debt 
service on the outstanding bonds. 
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delinquent special tax installment. In such cases, if the reserve fund is depleted, there 
could be a default or delay in the payment to the owners of the Bonds, since foreclosure 
by court proceedings is subject to litigation delays. Hence, although a judicial foreclosure 
action can be commenced, there is no assurance that it will be completed or that it will be 
completed in a timely manner.  
 
In the event of an unsuccessful foreclosure sale, the district may pursue other alternatives 
such as workout opportunities, for example. In a workout, an investor buys the bonds at a 
deep discount but for that to occur, there needs to be a compromise between all 




In some instances, due to heterogeneity of the owners of the property within a CFD (or 
the pieces of land they own), a few land owners might default, while others continue their 
regular payment of special taxes. In such cases, a foreclosure sale is initiated against only 
the delinquent parcels. In the mean time, the shortfall in special taxes is covered by an 
increase in the special taxes levied on the non-delinquent parcels, up to the maximum rate 
pursuant to the Rate and Method of Apportionment. If a foreclosure sale fails, the issuing 
agency will analyze other available alternatives for curing the default. For instance, it will 
consider a settlement agreement with a potential new developer who promises to buy the 
property and bring all delinquencies current. Such agreement, however, might be 
accompanied by certain expectations on behalf of the new property owner that might lead 
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to a conflict situation involving several parties: the new owner, the existing owners, the 
issuing agency, etc.  In certain instances, it might be very difficult to achieve a 
compromise among all parties. 
 
This paper was motivated by a real life case of a defaulted CFD and translates that 
example into a simple model of the strategic behavior and interaction among the 
participants in a CFD. The CFD bonds were issued in the early 1990s to finance the 
acquisition and construction of certain public improvements, including roads, flood 
control facilities, sewer and park and open space facilities. At the time of sale, only one 
of the lots in the district was in a graded and finished condition and there was a very high 
concentration of ownership. The appraised value of the district was four times the 
aggregate principal amount of the issued bonds. The developer’s intention was to develop 
its property primarily for commercial uses, with potential subsequent transfers of 
ownership of the property within the district prior to the completion of the project. At the 
time of bond sale, the developer had completed one office building and planned to have 
four additional buildings completed by the end of the first year (which would have 
constituted approximately 20% of the parcels to be developed in the district). The entire 
project was expected to be completed within approximately ten years. However, due to a 
number of reasons, the unimproved parcels did not get developed as planned and in ten 
years, 93% of the property still remained undeveloped. The owners of the revenue 
producing buildings continued to pay their special taxes but the tax burden for the 
property owners of about 86% of all parcels in the district (the non-developed parcels) 
became too high when they could not develop their property and they defaulted on their 
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special tax payments. The Superior Court appointed a receiver who represented the 
owners of secured notes of property located in the district, and subsequently ordered the 
approval of a new developer to acquire the property from the current owners. Pursuant to 
a settlement agreement between the district and that developer, the developer agreed to 
pay the delinquent taxes and legal expenses in exchange for the district removing the next 
year’s special tax levy from the tax bill, waiving penalties, interest and costs related to 
the delinquent special taxes and dismissing the foreclosure proceedings filed on the 
property. The developer purchased the property for its market value absent the debt. 
Subsequently, a restructuring of the district was in the process of occurring7 with change 
proceedings and new Rate and Method of special tax to be adopted. The proposed 
restructuring created a conflict for the existing property owner who had always paid his 
taxes on a timely basis and was initially opposed to the new structure. The next section 
describes the model and each owner’s resulting response under each scenario. 
 
3 The Model 
 
The purpose of our stylized model is to explore the situation of curing8 partial default. 
Partial default occurs when some of the owners of the land decide to default on their 
special tax payments, while other owners prefer to continue the payments on a timely 
basis. In that case, the default can be cured by selling the defaulted property to new 
                                                 
7 In line with the ability to refinance the existing debt to reduce the annual debt service. 
8 Resolving default through foreclosure sale, settlement agreement, or other legally available rights and 
remedies for enforcement of a bond contract and restoring the regular payment of interest and principal on 
the bonds.  
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owners9. The new owners are allowed to negotiate with the County on a new schedule of 
tax payments, which, if adopted, will affect also the old owners. Typically, new schedules 
involve an extension of the final maturity date of the bonds issued to finance the 
particular project, which implies extending the term of special tax payments for the old 
owners. This situation may adversely affect their payoffs, which creates a potential 
conflict that we explore in game-theoretic terms below. 
 
The partial default considered here may occur, for example, because of the owners’ 
heterogeneity in income or investment decisions. In our model, however, we do not look 
into the factors that caused the default occurrence. That is, we assume that the default 
event is exogenous and happens at some given moment 0>dt . Also, for simplicity, we 
assume that initially (at 0=t ) there are only two pieces of property, a and b, that belong 
to two owners, A and B1, respectively. Owner A is the one who will later continue her 
tax payments10, and owner B1 is the one who will default .  
 
For the purpose of our model, we assume that at moment 0=t owners A and B1 own two 
different pieces of property and have different development plans for improving their 
property. Both A and B1 make non-transferable investments related to the land they own 
and the development plans they have in mind. Some of those might include, for example, 
costs associated with engineering and hydrological studies, obtaining necessary permits 
and entitlements, etc. However, as time passes by, market conditions change and there is 
                                                 
9 The County sells the defaulted properties at foreclosure sales. 
10 We assume that owner A is not willing to or able to buy owner B1’s land when B1 defaults. That might 
be the case for a number of reasons: B1’s land is planned for development or is developed in such a way 
that does not fit owner A’s specialization or A is simply not interested. 
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an idiosyncratic shock that affects owner B1’s property in that there is no longer demand 
for the type of product owner B1 had planned for. As a result, owner B1’s project 
construction and sales do not proceed according to plan and she is unable to meet her 
scheduled special tax payments. Consequently, at moment dtt =  owner B1 defaults on 
her payments, and the new owner, B, purchases the defaulted property11. Owner B may 
prefer to implement a new schedule of payments, under which the final payment term is 
extended by a fixed number of years to 2T  (typically 12 TT > ). Also, the new schedule of 
payments involves a new tax rate (set by the County if the proposal is approved). This 
reflects the fact that a new structure is proposed for the development project that 
contemplates the refinancing of the still outstanding debt by issuing new bonds. The new 
schedule of payments must be approved by the County. In case of approval, it is proposed 
to individual A.  
 
B’s development plan for the defaulted property she purchases is different from B1’s 
original plan, since market conditions have changed and B’s plan is in accordance with 
the new economic environment. Thus, all investments previously made by B1 for her 
original development purpose are now worthless to B, who has to start the development 
of her property from the very beginning and undertake new engineering and hydrological 
studies, change the zoning and use of her property, obtain new permits and entitlements, 
and thus make investments that match her development plan and her newly proposed 
project. As a result, owners A and B have different investments. Owner A has invested 
                                                 
11 In reality, as we described in the Background section, there is always a gap between the moment in 
which the default occurs and the time it is actually cured. For simplicity, however, in our model we assume 
that the default is cured immediately. This does not impact the results, since the equilibria we derive will be 
the same even if we assumed that default occurred at moment td and was cured at moment ctd. 
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previously and the development of her product is moving along, which implies that she 
now has to incur relatively less costs in investing going forward as opposed to owner B 
who needs to start from scratch in developing the property she purchased. 
 
Under a more general scenario, we can assume that owners A, B1, and B are identical 
and have identical development plans and initial ability. Owner A and B1 both buy 
property and start to develop it, in the process of which they make non-transferable 
investments. This is very much in line with the literature on hold-up costs and insider 
versus outsider wages, in which two entrepreneurs invest time and resources in their 
personal knowledge of what they will do to operate the investment. Then, all of a sudden, 
there is an idiosyncratic economic shock such that owner B1 no longer wants or is no 
longer able to continue owning and developing her property. Consequently, she defaults 
and owner B buys the property. Even though owners A and B are ex ante identical and 
would have had the same costs had they started at the same time, due to the fact that 
owner A has already made some investments that owner B has yet to make (since owner 
B1’s investment cannot be transferred to owner B due to the match between B1 and her 
initial project), owners A and B will have different maximization calculuses going 
forward.  
 
Thus, as a result of the heterogeneity in investment decisions and the market shocks that 
occur between the time of initial investment and the moment of default, the expected 
payoffs of owners A and B calculated at moment dt when the conflict situation may arise 
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the corresponding payoffs of owners A and B when no change in the schedule of tax 
payments in proposed (i.e., when the originally existing scheme of tax payments 
continues). If the change in the schedule of tax payments is implemented, the expected 
payoffs of the two owners change correspondingly to atdπ
~ and btdπ
~ . The expected payoffs 
a
td
π and btdπ reflect owner A’s and owner B’s expectations about the dynamics of the 
corresponding markets between moments dt and 1T  when the original tax schedule is in 
place,  while the expected payoffs atdπ
~ and btdπ
~  take into account the owners’ expectations 
about the dynamics of the corresponding markets between moments dt and 2T  when the 
new schedule of tax payments has been implemented. Consequently, what matters for 












G ππ −= ~ , respectively, if the change in the schedule of tax 
payments is implemented. These gains will enter as the key parameters in our model. 
Ultimately, the key decision to be made by owner B of whether or not to propose the 
change in tax payments and the key decision of owner A of whether to accept or reject 
the proposed change in the schedule of tax payments are influenced by these net gains 
and other parameters that are introduced below.  
                                                 
12 One can think of several ways of parameterizing these expected payoffs. For example, they can be 
calculated using an “asset-pricing” like model with parameters such as a discount rate, a tax rate, and a 
volatility parameter. Such and other similar parameterizations, however, require very restrictive 
assumptions while the overall number of parameters does not decrease. Therefore, for the purposes of 





4 The game 
 
We model the conflict situation that arises when there is an attempt to cure default by a 
three-stage game. At stage 1 the new owner, player B, decides if she wants to implement 
the change in the schedule of payments. At stage 2 the incumbent player, player A, can 
either accept the change, or decide to go to court. At stage 3, which happens if player A 
decides to go to court, both players simultaneously choose their court expenditures, and 
the court makes its decision. 
 
We will analyze all possible subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) in pure strategies. 
We start with the subgame of stage 3, when the players choose their court investments. 
The court makes a decision YES, that is, in favor of the proposed change, or NO, that is, 
against the proposed change. Let ),( ba cc  denote pairs of court expenditures of players A 
and B. For simplicity we assume that each player can either spend a large cost of C or a 
small cost of c , with 0>> cC . Let p denote the probability that the court makes the 
YES decision provided both players spend c . We call this situation the “unbiased court.” 
We also assume that the court stays unbiased if both players spend the same amount C . 
Thus, 
pCCYESccYES == )},(|Pr{)},(|Pr{ . 
 
The court becomes “biased in favor of B”, i.e. is more likely to decide YES on the change, 
if player A spends c  while player B spendsC . Similarly, the court becomes “biased in 
 85
favor of A”, i.e. is less likely to decide YES, if player A spends C  while player B 
spends c . We model this by assuming that 
αα −=+= pcCYESpCcYES )},(|Pr{       ,)},(|Pr{ . 
Parameter }]1,min{,0[ pp −∈α  describes the magnitude of the court bias associated with 
cost difference cC − .  
Note that if 0≤bG , player B will not propose the change at stage 1. Also, 
if 0≥aG , player A will accept the change at stage 2. Thus, a necessary condition for 
stage 3 to occur is 
 0<aG  and 0>bG .      (*) 












pp ππ )1(~)0,0( −+=Π≡Π , 
denote expected profits of players A and B at stage 3 when they both spend nothing for 
the court. When both players spend c or C the court is unbiased but the expected profits 
will decrease by c or C: 
ccc aa −Π=Π ),( ,      ccc bb −Π=Π ),( , 
or 
CCC aa −Π=Π ),( ,      CCC bb −Π=Π ),(  




























−−Π=−+−+−=Π απαπα )1(~)(),( . 
Figure 1 shows the subgame of stage 3 in its normal form. It is a 22×  game where each 
pair of strategies can potentially be Nash equilibrium (NE). 
 c C 
c ca −Π , cb −Π  cG aa −+Π α , CGbb −+Π α  
C CG aa −−Π α , cGbb −−Π α Ca −Π , Cb −Π  
Figure 1. Subgame of stage 3 in the normal form. Player A is the row player, while player 
B is the column player.  
 
Equilibria of stage 3 subgame 
(c,c) is a NE when aGcC α−>−  and bGcC α>− . In other words, in this case the cost 
of biasing the court is so high for both owners A and B that they do not want to incur that 
cost and invest the minimal amount when they go to court. 
(c,C) is a NE when ba GcCG αα <−<− , i.e. for player A the cost of biasing the court is 
still high, while for player B it is not so high. Since 0>− cC , it follows that ba GG <− , 
i.e. B’s gain is greater than A’s loss. 
(C,c) is NE when ab GcCG αα −<−< , which also implies that ba GG >− , i.e. A’s loss 
is greater than B’s gain from the proposed change. 
(C,C) is NE when aGcC α−<−  and bGcC α<− , i.e. the cost of biasing the court is 
sufficiently low for both players. 
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We now proceed with backward induction to stage 2. In the stage 2 subgame, player A 
decides if she prefers to go to court or simply accept the change. To make this decision, 
player A compares the expected payoff of going to court with atdπ
~ , her payoff after the 
change.  
Equilibria of stage 2 subgame 
(c,c). When aGcC α−>−  and bGcC α>− , player A’s expected equilibrium payoff of 











 (recall that 0<aG ). Player A will go to court and spend 
c if her expected loss is sufficiently big compared to c, but not too big to have to bias the 


















min , i.e. 
player A’s loss from the change is small, and she will opt not to go to court at all. 
(c,C). When ba GcCG αα <−<− , player A compares cG aa −+Π α  and atdπ
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In this case player A will not go to court. 
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(C,c). When ab GcCG αα −<−< , player A compares CG aa −−Π α  and atdπ
































necessarily CpcC αα <+−− )1)(( . In this case player A will not go to court. 






























 and it must be 
that CpcC α<−− )1)(( . In this case, player A will not go to court. 
 
Thus, in all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNEs), if stage 2 is reached, there are two 
possibilities: (a) player A will choose to go to court and (b) player A will not. The 
corresponding conditions on the parameters conform to the intuition. 
 
We complete backward induction by analyzing stage 1. In the stage 1 subgame, player B 
decides whether she proposes the change in the schedule of tax payments or leaves the 
schedule unchanged. Knowing that player A will in some circumstances go to court if the 
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change is proposed (we still assume at this point that the “conflict condition” (*) holds), 
player B needs to compare her corresponding payoff at stage 3 with btdπ , her expected 
payoff if no change is implemented. 
Equilibria of stage 1 subgame 






, player B’s expected equilibrium 




c π>−Π , i.e. cpGb > . Player B’s expected gain from the change exceeds 




c b −<< , i.e. player B’s gain is not 
















cGb ,min . In this case player B’s 
gain is too small, and she will not propose the change. 














min , player A will not go to court, 
i.e. player B will always propose the change provided condition (*) holds. 
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As we showed in the previous section, there are three types of Subgame Perfect Nash 
Equilibria under condition (*): 
 
(i) Equilibria (c,c)(a)(1), (c,C)(a)(1), (C,c)(a)(1), (C,C)(a)(1) are the SPNEs 
where player B proposes the change despite player A’s threat to go to court. 
Then player A goes to court (the threat is credible), and the players spend the 
corresponding amounts. 
(ii) Equilibria (c,c)(a)(2), (c,C)(a)(2), (C,c)(a)(2), (C,C)(a)(2) are the SPNEs 
where player B proposes no change because player A’s threat to go to court is 
credible, and the resulting expected gain of player B is not sufficient to cover 
court expenses. 
(iii) Equilibria (c,c)(b), (c,C)(b), (C,c)(b), (C,C)(b) are the SPNEs where player 
A’s threat to go to court is not credible, i.e. player B always proposes the 
change, and A accepts it. 
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Eventually, all equilibria are the result of players A and B performing a cost-benefit 
analysis in every case and making decisions based on their corresponding expected gains, 
the influence of the court and the expected expenditures they would incur if they choose 
to go to court. 
 
If we were to analyze the equilibria from a social point of view, we need to take into 
consideration that in our model the default event is exogenous. The fact that the property 
defaulted means that something went wrong and thus socially there are likely to be 
reasons for something to be changed (e.g., payments to be changed, restructured). Recall 
that B’s development plan for the defaulted property she purchases is different from B1’s 
original plan and is in accordance with the new economic environment. Thus, assuming 
that B’s plan will provide such a change, we can assume that socially good equilibria are 
the ones for which B’s plan is implemented. This implies that the second set of equilibria, 
(ii), is not one of them.  
 
Another consideration for what constitutes “good” equilibria takes into account the time 
and costs associated with going to court (lobbying, rent seeking, etc.).  Those are 
unnecessary social costs that make more difficult and delay the curing of default and the 
successful development of the project. Thus, it appears that socially optimal outcome is 
the one in which the players do not go to court. Looking at our three types of Subgame 
Perfect Nash Equilibria, the first set of equilibria, (i), involves social costs related to 
going to court and thus is socially not optimal. Thus, the third set of equilibria is socially 
optimal, since it results in the implementation of the change proposed by player B, does 
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not involve unnecessary costs in going to court and leads to a more timely resolution of 
the partial default. 
 
This set of equilibria can be induced by policy actions affecting the following parameters 
of our model: C, c, p, and α. Recall that α describes the magnitude of the court bias 
associated with cost difference C – c and therefore in some sense measures the level of 
corruption. When α is decreased along with increasing C – c or c, it becomes very costly 
to bias the court, i.e. the level of corruption is low and this type of equilibria is more 
likely to occur.  
 
Parameter p in our model reflects that the court is unbiased, i.e. it reflects the quality of 
the argument from the County’s side that the proposed change is beneficial. To increase p 
is costly (if there is court, the County spends public money to prove that the change is 
justified), thus the credibility of the County’s decision to approve the new schedule of 
payments must be high. This implies that issuers should carefully evaluate various 
alternatives for curing partial default to ensure the best option is chosen. Since the 
County in our model approves the change proposed by player B, this should serve as a 
signal to player A that if that is the case, the change is beneficial and the court will also 





Our stylized model explores the situation of curing partial default and the potential 
conflicts that might arise between the new owner taking over the defaulted property and 
the previously existing property owners who have never been delinquent in their special 
tax payments. Since each party has a different agenda and defends its own interest, a 
conflict situation might occur, which we analyze from a game-theoretical perspective to 
obtain the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.  The results we arrive at are quite intuitive. 
Every equilibrium is a result of interplay between expected gains from introducing and 
accepting a change in the schedule of tax payments and possible losses due to going to 
court and investing in the court decision. 
 
This model can be used to analyze the interaction among all participants in a workout or a 
settlement aiming at curing a “partially defaulted” issue and their optimal behavior, given 
certain conditions, which might provide useful insights to both the issuer (the public 
agency) and the developers involved on how to most efficiently structure such 
transactions.  
 
There are many ways to extend this model, one of which is to endogenize the default 
occurrence and analyze the factors that caused it. This, however, is the subject of another 
paper which studies the factors that influence default. Other important assumptions are 
the owners’ risk neutrality and exogeneity of the legislative process and taxation. Other 
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possible extensions might consider the opportunity to delay investments, as well as the 
introduction of public goods properties in our model.   
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Determinants of the default and redemption of the non-rated 









In this essay we build upon previously existing statistical models of high yield 
corporate bonds to determine the major factors that contribute to the default or 
redemption of non-rated CFD bonds. We refine the variables utilized in other 
studies to capture the specific characteristics of the non-rated Mello-Roos 
market in California. Our model incorporates the aging effect and various 
macroeconomic factors that affect the California non-rated land secured market. 
We have used the multinomial logit model to determine the relative importance 
of each of these factors on the change in the status of a CFD bond from 
“normal” to redeemed or defaulted. Our results show that age is significant both 
for the redemption and the default of a bond, with younger bonds more likely to 
default and less likely to be redeemed and older bonds more likely to be 
redeemed and less likely to default. In addition, a weaker economy is more 
likely to lead to more defaults and less redemptions among outstanding non-
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In the earlier essays we described the default experience of the non-rated land secured 
bond market in California during the period 1985-2004. We specifically discussed the 
impact of various economic factors and policy changes1 on the performance and default 
history of the non-rated Mello-Roos (CFD)2 bonds.  As a next step, we built a model that 
explored the strategic behavior and interaction of the participants involved with a 
community facilities district in curing a partial default and discussed their optimal 
behavior given certain conditions. However, in both of the prior essays we did not focus 
on determining the relative importance of each of the various factors in explaining the 
default occurrence of the non-rated CFD bonds. In fact, our stylized model assumed that 
the default event was exogenous.    
 
In this essay we build upon previously existing statistical models of high yield corporate 
bonds to determine the major factors that contribute to default, as well as redemption, of 
non-rated CFD bonds. We refine the variables utilized in other studies to capture the 
specific characteristics of the non-rated Mello-Roos market in California. Our model 
incorporates the aging effect and the state of the economy as measured by the number of 
residential building permits issued, the total value of non-residential development, and 
the 10-year Treasury rate, as well as the total outstanding indebtedness of the issuers of 
non-rated CFD bonds and the effect of the change in legislation with regard to annual 
                                                 
1 Such as employment, residential building permit issuance, interest rates and other macroeconomic indices, 
as well as the S.E.C. Rule 15c2-12(b)(5) that required annual disclosure reports to be filed by all issuers of  
Mello-Roos bonds sold after July 1, 1995. 
2 Bonds secured by special taxes levied to finance public infrastructure in California.  For more details 
please refer to Section II of Essay I. 
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reporting for bonds issued after July 1, 1995. We have used the multinomial logit model 
to determine the relative importance of each of these factors on the change in the status of 
a CFD bond from “normal”3 to redeemed or defaulted. 
 
The essay is organized as follows: in the next section, we review the existing default 
literature, then describe the data we have utilized in our analysis and present the model. 
Further, we continue with a discussion of the empirical results obtained and a summary 
conclusion of the findings of our study. 
 
2 Review of the Existing Literature 
 
Numerous studies have looked for an explanation of the fluctuations in default rates, 
trying to determine the major factors that contribute to the variation in default occurrence. 
Fons (1991), Helwege and Kleiman (1996), Jonsson and Fridson (1996), Jonsson, 
Fridson, and Zhong (1996), among others, developed statistical models which identified 
that default was influenced by three major factors: credit quality, the state of the economy, 
and the age of the bonds under investigation.  
 
The regression equation used by Fons included only two of these factors, credit quality 
and macroeconomic conditions, and found that over half of the variation in default rates 
over time could be explained using those factors. To model credit quality, Fons used the 
credit ratings of the bonds he studied, tracking the distribution of issuers within each 
                                                 
3 If a bond is issued in year zero with a scheduled maturity in year N, for all t<N, the bond is outstanding 
and if t=N, the bond matures. Thus, we define the status of a bond as “normal” if the bond is outstanding 
for all t<N or the bond matures if t=N. 
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rating category over time. He then multiplied that distribution by the historical average 
one-year default rate for each rating category and obtained the annual expected default 
rate for the high yield market. The Blue Chip median GNP growth forecasts at the start of 
each year from 1977 through 1991 was another explanatory variable in his model that 
served as a proxy for how default is impacted by macroeconomic effects. The results 
obtained by Fons showed that variation in actual default rates is negatively correlated 
with changes in the real GNP and positively correlated with changes in “expected” 
default rates.  
 
Later studies built upon Fons model. Helwege and Kleiman (1996), for example, 
recognized that few defaults occurred in the first few years after issuance and that 
defaults were, in fact, most likely to occur three years after the bonds have been issued. 
To account for that, their model incorporated the so-called “aging factor”, which 
measured the impact of the length of time that risky bonds were outstanding on the 
default rate. The aging effect was modeled by adding an explanatory variable 
representing “the dollar amount of B3-rated issues outstanding lagged three years”. In 
addition, the authors also suggested that default rates were not symmetrically affected by 
changes in macroeconomic factors. They argued that the effect of a decline in the GDP 
growth below a certain threshold would impact investment-grade bonds less than bonds 
from the speculative-grade category. In order to measure that effect, Helwege and 
Kleiman added a recession indicator variable that equaled one if GDP growth was equal 
to or fell below 1.5%. They further formed an interaction variable by multiplying the 
recession indicator variable by the expected default rate (as measured in the Fons model). 
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Using the newly formed interaction variable, Helwege and Kleiman showed that a high 
fraction of lower rated bonds issued in the high yield market is more likely to lead to an 
increase in default rates in the case of an economic downturn than the “distribution of 
higher tier speculative grade credits.”  
 
Jonsson and Fridson (1996) and Jonsson, Fridson, and Zhong (1996) further extended the 
model introduced by Fons in 1991 by developing a statistical framework similar to that of 
Helwege and Kleiman. They, too, studied the three major factors influencing default: 
credit quality, the state of the economy, and the aging effect. The independent variables 
in their models were able to explain almost 87% of the variation in the annual default 
rates of Moody’s speculative-grade bonds. Jonsson and Fridson’s model combined two 
factors in one variable, “the fraction of high yield bond issuance rated B3 or lower by 
Moody’s lagged by three years”, which measured simultaneously the aging effect4 and 
the credit quality5. In addition, the authors used different proxies for the macroeconomic 
effects that were “more closely tied to the financial health of corporations” and thus had 
greater explanatory power – corporate profits and the liabilities of failed businesses. 
Jonsson, Fridson, and Zhong (1996), on the other hand, further extended these models by 
including variables6 which attempted to “assess the investor optimism in the market” and 
“the accessibility of the equity markets as alternative or supplemental sources of 
financing for risky borrowers,” rather than measure the state of the economy. Their study 
                                                 
4 As represented by the lag. 
5 As measured by the fraction of low rated bonds. 
6 Those variables included the NASDAQ price-to-earnings ratio, the Standard & Poor’s price-to-earnings 
ratio, the difference between the S&P price-to-earnings ratio and the NASDAQ price-to-earnings ratio, and 
gross proceeds of initial public offerings (IPOs).  
 102
showed that default rates were inversely related to successful IPOs and high price-to-
earnings ratios.  
 
The subject of all these studies is the fluctuation in the default rates and the default 
occurrence of high-yield corporate bonds. All of them show that macroeconomic 
conditions, credit quality differences, and the age of the bonds impact defaults. To our 
knowledge, how such factors affect the default of the non-rated Mello-Roos bonds in 
California has not been analyzed. In the following sections, we examine the factors 
affecting the default occurrence of the non-rated CFD bonds and build upon these 
previous models by refining the variables used to better reflect the characteristics of the 
non-rated land-secured market in California. Our model incorporates the aging effect, the 
state of the economy, and the policy change introduced in 1995.  In addition, we use 
regression analysis to determine the relative importance of each of the factors in 
explaining the change in the status of the evaluated CFD bonds from “normal” to 
redeemed or defaulted. 
 
3 The Data 
 
We create an unbalanced panel data set, the spatial dimension of which pertains to a set 
of non-rated CFD bonds that were either issued or outstanding during the period 1990-
1997.  As we demonstrated in our first essay, the number of actual defaults of non-rated 
CFD bonds was small compared to the total issuance for that period, with 78% of all 
defaults occurring prior to 1998.  Given that and the fact that we did not have sufficient 
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information7 to utilize data for the entire period 1985-2004, we focus only on the period 
1990-1997, which we feel provides significant representation of the non-rated Mello-
Roos market in California8. The temporal dimension of our panel data set pertains to the 
periodic observations of the following variables characterizing the non-rated CFD bonds 
over the eight-year period under investigation: new residential building permit issuance, 
total nonresidential valuation (which we adjust for inflation and transform in 1990-dollars 
to make it comparable across time), employment, 10-year Treasury rate, the age of each 
bond in each year under investigation, as well as total outstanding long-term debt of the 
issuers of the non-rated bonds (again calculated in 1990-dollars).  
 
We have utilized numerous sources in order to compile the data in our panel. Issuance 
and default data were collected from the California Debt and Investment Advisory 
Commission (CDIAC) at the State Treasurer’s Office, California Tax Data, Income 
Securities Advisors, Inc., Securities Data, the Bond Buyer, the Municipal Bond Advisor, 
and numerous industry professionals such as the corporate trust departments of banks 
acting as trustees or fiscal agents, underwriting and bond counsel firms, and Fieldman, 
Rolapp & Associates.  The information received included pertinent default and issuance 
information as well as redemption and maturity dates, where applicable.  Each defaulted 
transaction is counted only once, at the first time of default occurrence, and is dropped 
                                                 
7 Such as the total outstanding indebtedness of the issuers of non-rated CFD bonds. 
8 Furthermore, the bonds issued in the early years, prior to 1990, are captured in the data we examine, 
reflecting the time that has elapsed from their issuance date to the date of analysis. This is the case, since, 
as we showed in our first essay (and particularly, in Table 2), there were no defaults and redemptions of 
non-rated CFD bonds between 1985 and 1990. 
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from the sample afterwards9. This is consistent with the methodology used in existing 
default studies and in the mortality rate analysis in our first essay. 
 
The macroeconomic data in our sample is on a per County basis and was gathered from a 
variety of sources such as the California Employment Development Department, 
California Department of Finance, the Construction Industry Research Board, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, the U.S. Bureau of Labor, the Bond 
Buyer Yearbooks, the Labor Market Information Division, etc. Information on the 
indebtedness of the bond issuers was obtained from the Census of Local Governments for 
the period being analyzed.  
 




We use a sample of 571 individual non-rated CFD transactions (i.e. 571 individual 
groups) that were issued or outstanding in the bond market at any time during the period 
January 1990 – December 1997, resulting in an unbalanced panel data set comprised of 
2,985 observations. Based on the sample data, we calculate the age of the bond 
transaction in each year under investigation as compared to the date of its initial issuance. 
We further track the “status” of each issue i in each year t, i.e. if it is “normal” (i.e., was 
outstanding or matured), was refunded, or defaulted in year t. Thus: 
                                                 




                 0 if bond issue i is outstanding or matures in year t10;  
=itStatus       1 if bond issue i is redeemed in year t; 
     2 if bond issue i defaults in year t. 
 
Since more than two different scenarios are possible, we build a multinomial logit model 
that allows each of the three different alternatives to be considered at the same time. The 
three scenarios imply that we need two dummy variables to describe the resulting status, 
with each dummy equaling one only when that particular case has occurred. In our model 
we select status = 0 as the “base” alternative, so we compare each other status case to this 
base alternative with a logit equation. Since there are three different alternatives, there are 
two different logit equations in our multinomial logit model system, with the dependent 
variable of these equations being the log of the odds of the k-th alternative compared to 












where:  kitP  =  the probability of the ith issue in year t to have status corresponding 
to the k-th alternative 
 bitP  = the probability of the ith issue in year t to have status corresponding 
to the base alternative. 
 
                                                 
10 Outstanding if t<N or matures if t=N when N is the year of scheduled maturity of the bond. 
 106
To estimate our multinomial logit model we use maximum likelihood estimation. The 






















































,where r = redeemed, d = defaulted, and o = “normal”(outstanding or matured), and 
where: 
1−itBP           =  Building permit issuance for the county of the local  
            government with bond issue i lagged by one year 
1−itNRV          =  Non-residential valuation in 1990-year dollars for the   
            county  of the local government with bond issue i lagged by  
            one  year 
tTres                   =  The 10-year Treasury rate in year t 
italDebtRe     =  Total long-term debt outstanding for the county of the local  
             government with bond issue i in year t expressed in 1990- 
             year dollars 
tDummy95   =   Dummy variable equal to one for all years 1995 and greater  
               but only for bonds issued after July 1, 1995; reflects a     
               structural change (the 1995 federal law enforcing annual  
               disclosure reports from all issuers of Mello-Roos bonds   
               issued after July 1, 1995) 
itAgeDummy  = A set of age dummies that equal one if the respective bond 
is in the indicated age group. 
 
The bonds’ age pattern is highly non-linear (as we demonstrate in Figure II and Figure III 
later in our essay). Therefore, if we were to include their age as an explanatory variable in 
our model, we would not be able to capture that non-linearity. An alternative way would 
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be to use a set of age dummy variables for the years since each bond was issued in our 
regressions. This will help better capture the effect of age on the status of the bonds11. 
However, due to the specific nature of our data, including age dummies for each bond 
age would limit the degrees of freedom in our model and the log of the likelihood ratios 
would be poorly defined. Keeping that in mind, we have captured the shape of the age 
dependence by creating a set of age dummies for bonds of specific age groups. This 
results in higher degrees of freedom and a better fitted model that reflects the existing 
non-linear dependence of age for bond redemptions and defaults. 
 
4.2 Choice of Explanatory Variables 
 
4.2.1 Credit Quality 
 
In their August 1999 study, Keenan, Sobehart, and Hamilton recognized, like many 
authors before them have done, that since Fons (1991), most forecasting models and 
statistical studies of default have utilized corporate bond ratings as indicators of the 
overall credit quality of the bond issuers. The bonds in our study, however, are non-rated, 
and thus ratings are not available as a means of measuring credit quality for the issues in 
our sample. Furthermore, non-rated Mello-Roos bonds are quite different from high yield 
corporate bonds (which were the subject of most previous default research). This is the 
case for a number of reasons. First, a greater percentage of “junk” bonds represent 
unsecured obligations, while CFD bonds are secured by special tax revenues on the 
                                                 
11 In addition, including years remaining until maturity as an explanatory variable might also be considered 
but all bonds in our sample have the same length at issue (i.e., they are all 30-year bonds), so including that 
additional explanatory variable will not add anything to our set of age dummies. 
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property for which such bonds are being issued. Thus, Mello-Roos bonds are liens on the 
property, not a personal obligation of the borrower, while high yield “junk” bonds are 
personal obligations and are typically unsecured, which implies that for the same obligor, 
“junk” bonds are riskier than Mello-Roos bonds. Assuming the efficient market 
hypothesis holds, the market understands this and prices it accordingly.  
 
Calculating the yield spread between CFD bonds and treasuries might be one alternative 
way of measuring credit quality but information on the average yields of non-rated CFD 
bonds is very hard to obtain due to the specific nature of these bonds and the fact that 
each CFD bond issue reflects the unique credit of the project it is financing. Given that, 
the municipal market has established a special set of criteria to help assess the credit 
quality of each non-rated CFD bond issue. These include, among others, the value-to-lien, 
status of development, and diversification of ownership at the time of bond issuance. We 
believe that these characteristics of a CFD bond issue will have a strong explanatory 
power and be an important factor in assessing the risk of default. However, historical data 
on these criteria cannot be obtained for all CFD bonds issued, especially given the fact 
that such information is only available (and is included in the offering document with 
which the bonds are marketed) at the time of bond issuance, and is not tracked 
afterwards12. With all that in mind, we did not account explicitly for credit quality in our 
study. Utilizing the individual characteristics we identified above as a proxy of credit 
quality can be one way of expanding our analysis in the future, provided that such data 
can be obtained. 
                                                 
12 Ownership information might be available from the assessor’s office but an appraisal of the property by a 
qualified appraiser is necessary to determine status of development and value-to-debt burden.  
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4.2.2 Macroeconomic Factors 
 
Previous default studies show that there is a strong relationship between the state of the 
economy and the default occurrence and performance of high yield bonds. For example, 
in their “Municipal Default Risk Revisited” report, Litvack and McDermott demonstrate 
that there is a correlation between the percentage change in GDP and the annual dollar 
volume of defaults, with a one-year lag resulting in an even stronger correlation. The 
authors further argue that “municipal defaults appear to be lagging economic indicators,” 
a result observed by Altman and Arman (2001), who examined the interdependency 
between defaults and economic recessions and found that in most of the cases, peaks in 
default rates were observed at the end of the recession or soon thereafter. The same holds 
true for non-rated CFD bonds, whose performance, as we showed in our first, and further 
explained in our second, essay, tends to lag the market due to their built-in reserve funds, 
capitalized interest accounts and other liquidity sources. Given their specific nature, non-
rated Mello-Roos bonds are lagging indicators of the real estate market, a fact we have 
considered in determining the explanatory variables we use in our model. 
 
Economic activity, and especially, the performance of the real estate market, has a 
significant impact on the performance of the non-rated CFD bonds. As we demonstrated 
in our first essay, a strong economy and rapid development, measured by high residential 
building permit issuance and low unemployment, are typically associated with strong 
issuance of land secured bonds and lower default risk. As proxies of the macroeconomic 
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effects that are more closely tied to the specific nature of the non-rated land-secured 
market in California, we use new residential building permit issuance lagged by one year, 
total non-residential valuation lagged by one year13, and the 10-year Treasury rate, which 
we anticipate to be significant for the change in the status of a non-rated CFD bond from 
outstanding to defaulted or redeemed. The use of the 10-year Treasury rate is justified, 
since when that rate increases, higher costs are realized (thus, higher likelihood of 
financial problems) and other investments become more attractive. When the 10-year 
Treasury is high, redeeming outstanding bonds might not make economic sense, since it 
might not result in sufficient savings to make the bond call worthwhile. We also 
considered utilizing employment as an explanatory variable in our model but due to its 
multicollinearity with building permit issuance (as illustrated in Figure I below and 
Figure IV in our first essay)14, decided against it. 
                                                 
13 Total non-residential valuation will be a good proxy for those CFD issues associated with commercial or 
industrial development. 
14 When building permit issuance is strong, employment is strong too.  
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An additional factor we have incorporated in our model is the indebtedness of the local 
governments issuing CFD bonds as represented by their total long-term debt outstanding 
in every year, which we have adjusted for inflation and calculated in real 1990-year 
dollars. It might be argued that this variable needs to be included in our regression 
equation because of the weak correlation that might exist between general obligation debt 
and CFD defaults due to the link to ad valorem tax rates. However, we do not expect that 
variable to be statistically significant for a number of reasons. First, due to Proposition 13 
in the State of California, property tax rates are limited to 1%15. Furthermore, most 
general obligation (GO) bonds require two-thirds voter approval, and the outstanding 
amount of GO bonds is nominal in the state of California. In addition, most California 
                                                 
15 For a detailed discussion, please refer to our first essay. 
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local governments’ goals and policies and bond market criteria limit total special and ad 
valorem taxes to 2%, while property taxes in other states may reach 6%-7%. Besides, the 
long-term debt outstanding16 is comprised of various types of debt (not only GO debt), 
most of which is also rated. Consequently, keeping all that in mind and recognizing the 
fact that Mello-Roos bonds are not obligations of the issuer but are secured by the liens 
on the property for which they are issued, we do not anticipate total long-term debt 
outstanding to be statistically significant when we estimate our model but for 
completeness and to check the possibility, have included it in our analysis. 
 
4.2.3 The “Aging” Effect 
 
The “aging” effect, as described in many studies17, reflects the time that elapses between 
a bond’s issuance and its default and is an important factor in explaining the likelihood of 
default occurrence of high yield corporate bonds. All previous research has demonstrated 
that defaults of low-rated bonds occur with a lag, namely that such bonds are less likely 
to default in the first year after they are issued and are most likely to default three years 
after issuance18. Altman and Arman (2001) argue that “bonds that default early in an 
issuer’s “life” show a weakness in the initial credit quality and standards used to assess 
the security.” They show that the percentage of defaults observed in the first three years 
after issuance for their entire sample period 1989-2001, was 53% of all defaults observed 
in that period, and that if we add to that fourth year defaults, the percentage increases to 
69%. Following Altman and Arman (2001), we examine the default distribution by age of 
                                                 
16 As presented by the Census of Local Governments. 
17 Such as Altman (1993), Jonsson and Fridson (1996) and others. 
18 Altman and Kishore (1995).  
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the bonds for our non-rated Mello-Roos bonds by year of default. The results are 





































1 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
2 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
3 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 50% 0 0%
4 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 17% 1 100%
5 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 17% 0 0%
6 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 17% 0 0%
7 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
8 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
9 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
10 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 6 100% 1 100%
1996 1997 1998 1999
1 2 40% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 8% 2 10%
2 0 0% 1 13% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 8% 2 10%
3 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 5 19% 3 14%
4 1 20% 1 13% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 15% 4 19%
5 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 4% 1 5%
6 2 40% 3 38% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 6 23% 6 29%
7 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
8 0 0% 1 13% 0 0% 0 0% 1 50% 0 0% 2 8% 1 5%
9 0 0% 2 25% 0 0% 0 0% 1 50% 0 0% 3 12% 2 10%
10 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 0 0% 1 4% 0 0%
Total 5 100% 8 100% 2 100% 1 100% 2 100% 0 0% 26 100% 21 100%
1989 1990 1991 1994
1988-2001







As can be seen from Table 1, for the entire period 1988-2001, only 35% of the non-rated 
Mello-Roos bonds that defaulted did so in the first three years of their “life”. If we 
consider our restricted sample (1990-1997), that result is 34%.  
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The age distribution of default is further illustrated in Figure II that shows three peaks of 
the non-rated CFD bond defaults, the highest one of which occurs in the sixth year after 
issuance for both the entire period 1988-2001, as well as for the period 1990-199719. 
 
The first peak in Figure II is inherent to the bonds in our sample. Similarly to the defaults 
of low-rated bonds, defaults of non-rated CFD bonds occur with a lag. Existing debt 
service reserve funds, capitalized interest accounts and other sources of liquidity that we 
described in greater detail in our first essay serve as a cushion that delays the actual 
default of bonds that would have otherwise defaulted in the first year after being issued. 
Such defaults correspond to the vulnerability of real estate development associated with 
financial failures due to thin or insufficient capital. The non-economic use of capital leads 
to negative cash flows that serve as the primary stressor inducing default. 
 
The second peak, occurring in the sixth year after issuance, is an artifact from a random 
issuance pattern combined with macroeconomic effects. In planning their undertaking, 
most developers measure the absorption of their projects from the time they receive 
certificates of occupancy instead of the time the bonds secured by the land in those 
projects are issued. Within six years of the issuance of the bonds, however, entitlements 
are obtained, development plans are usually completed, models are well underway, and 
the product is being absorbed. It is then though that a sudden significant change in any of 
the economic drivers of real estate development, such as price points, employment, 
                                                 
19 Figure II illustrates the age distribution of defaults over a longer time span (1988-2001) than the 1990-
1997 period we analyze in our paper. As we mentioned earlier, we have default data for that longer period 
of time but do not have all necessary information to allow us to use it in our regression analysis. That is 
why our multinomial logit model considers only the restricted sample (1990-1997).  
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demand, absorption, etc., has a detrimental impact on the project and ultimately leads to 
the default of the bond issue.  
 
Similar is the reasoning behind the third peak observed in Figure II, which occurs in the 
ninth year after issuance. By that time, project absorption is usually well underway, 
houses are being sold and escrows closed and it is only an economic downturn or a 
significant change in the macroeconomic environment that causes a stall in the 
development and prevents it from occurring as planned. That results in the developers’ 
inability to continue paying special taxes, which ultimately leads to default.   
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Figure II demonstrates that, just like for high yield corporate bonds, defaults of non-rated 
CFD bonds occur with a lag, but that lag is often greater than the one for “junk” bonds, 
and the age pattern of non-rated Mello-Roos defaults appears to be quite different from 
the one for low-rated corporate bonds.   
 
The age factor will also be important when analyzing the potential change in status of a 
non-rated CFD bond from “normal” to redeemed 20 . Figure III compares the age 
distribution of defaulted and redeemed bonds. In the earlier to mid years after the passage 
of the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act in California in 1982, most CFD bonds had 
10-year call protection, which precluded redemption in the first ten years after issuance. 
In later years, call redemption provisions became more flexible21, allowing bond calls 
five to six years after issuance22.  Consequently, we would expect that there will be a 
positive correlation between the age of bonds that are six to ten years old and their 
likelihood of redemption. 
                                                 
20 Age matters because the bonds of a CFD that experiences strong development during the first few years 
after issuance are more likely to be redeemed with the new bonds bearing lower interest rates, which are 
passed on to the property owners. In contrast, a CFD that does not progress much in development during 
the first few years becomes a more likely candidate for default, especially if there are adverse economic 
changes. 
21 As can be seen from Figure III, less than 6% of all redeemed bonds were called in the first three years 
after they were issued and only 7.38% of all redeemed bonds were redeemed in the first four years of their 
issuance date, with significantly more redemptions for bonds of ages five and six. 
22 Currently, for many non-rated Mello-Roos issues, even shorter call provisions can be observed, allowing 
the redemption of bonds at a premium as early as one year from their issuance, if economically feasible.  
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5 Empirical Results 
 
As previously described, the data we use is panel data, which contains information on the 
status of a sample of non-rated CFD bonds for the years 1990 to 1997. The three possible 
outcomes are “normal” (status = 0), redeemed (status = 1), and defaulted (status = 2). 
The base category is “normal”. Out of 2,985 observations, 2,897 belong to the base 
category (i.e. are either outstanding or matured), 67 are redeemed, and 21 have defaulted. 
The explanatory variables are as we explained earlier various macroeconomic, financial, 
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and policy-related factors, as well as age dummies to capture the age effect for bonds of 
various age groups. The results are given in Table 223.  
 
As expected, the likelihood of redeeming a bond depends on its age. Bonds that have 
been outstanding for six to ten years are more likely to be redeemed. There is a positive 
correlation between a bond of such age and the log-odds ratio between the bond being 
redeemed and the bond remaining in its base status. The age dummy variable for bonds of 
that age group is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. As can be seen from 
Table 2, there is a positive correlation between bonds that have been outstanding for three 
to five years and the log-likelihood ratio for those bonds to be redeemed, which is 
supported by our observation of the market allowing bond calls starting as early as the 
third year after issuance. However, the coefficient for the age dummy corresponding to 
that age group is not statistically significant. That might be due to the fact that very few 
bond issues of that age were actually redeemed. If a bond has been outstanding for more 
than 10 years, however, it is less likely that it will be redeemed. As expected, the 10-year 
Treasury rate is significant in this case as well. Its coefficient is negative, which implies 
that a higher 10-year Treasury rate leads to a lower likelihood of an outstanding bond to 
be redeemed. This result is justified, since in a higher interest rate environment, it might 
not be economically feasible to redeem an outstanding bond. As far as the real debt 
variable is concerned, as discussed earlier, we anticipated that it will not be statistically 
significant and that is indeed the case as illustrated in Table 2.  
 
                                                 
23 Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients of the independent variables from our multinomial logit 
model, with their standard errors, which have been adjusted for clustering, listed in parentheticals. 
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Most of the age dummies are significant in the second case with the exception of the age 
dummy variable for three- to five-year-old bonds. Their coefficient has the expected 
positive sign but is not statistically significant. Given the default distribution of the bonds 
we are examining, it is not surprising that this age dummy is not statistically meaningful 
for the change in the status of a bond from “normal” to defaulted. As can be seen from 
the results in Table 2, there is a positive correlation between six- to ten-year-old bonds 
and the log odds of those bonds changing their status from outstanding to defaulting. 
Since bond defaults in principal do not occur late in the life of a bond24, it is not 
surprising that the coefficient of the age dummy corresponding to bonds older than ten 
years has the expected negative sign.  Total long-term debt outstanding is not significant 
again, just as we expected for the reasons we discussed earlier.  
 
Macroeconomic factors, such as residential building permit issuance and non-residential 
valuation also play a role in explaining the likelihood of default. A one-unit increase in 
residential building permit issuance reduces the log-odds between a bond being 
outstanding and defaulting by -.0002. Since the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
difficult to interpret, it might be more helpful to see what the percentage change in the 
odds ratio between a bond defaulting and remaining in its “normal” status will be if the 
lagged residential building permits issuance were to increase by one standard deviation 
compared to its mean. If the lagged residential building permit issuance were to increase 
by one standard deviation compared to its mean, the odds of defaulting as compared to 
the base case would decrease by 60.5%. In a similar vein, given the fact that the 10-year 
                                                 
24 Since by then projects (funded through the issuance of such bonds) are usually well underway, building 
construction is nearly complete, there is greater diversification of ownership and higher value-to-debt ratio 
and thus lower risk of default. 
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treasury rate is significant for the redemption of bonds, if the 10-year treasury rate were 
to increase by one standard deviation as compared to its mean, the odds ratio between 
redemption as compared to the base case would decrease by 71%. These results support 
our expectation, as well as results from prior studies, that the state of the economy is a 
major determinant of how a bond performs and what status it is in.  
 
From Table 2 we can also see that the dummy variable we introduced to reflect the 
structural change of the federal requirement imposed in 1995 is statistically significant 
for the change in bond status from outstanding to redeemed, demonstrating a negative 
impact of the annual reporting requirement on bonds issued after July 1, 1995, and not 
significant for the default – no default case. However, given the fact that we only study 
bonds that were outstanding from 1990 to 1997, the total impact of this policy variable 
might not be fully captured by our data set. 
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BP t-1 -.0000 -.0002*
(.0001) (.0001)
















Number of Observations 2,414
Log-likelihood value -365.1243
Pseudo R-squared .1432
Note: * Statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.
** Statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.
Explanatory Variable





Our study has extended the research on the determinants of default occurrence among 
high yield corporate bonds to account for a specific sub-set of municipal bonds, the non-
rated Mello-Roos bonds in California. We have refined the variables included in previous 
studies to reflect the specific nature of the non-rated CFD bonds and have used 
multinomial logit analysis to identify those variables which determine whether a bond is 
redeemed, has defaulted, or has matured or remains outstanding in the municipal market. 
The results we obtain suggest that the key determinants in the change of the status of a 
CFD bond from “normal” to redeemed are the 10-year treasury rate and the age of the 
bond, while the change in status from “normal” to defaulted is impacted by the lagged 
performance of the real estate market (measured by the total number of new residential 
building permits issued lagged one year and total non-residential valuation lagged by one 
year) and the age of the bond.  
 
Our study confirms that a weaker economy, as measured by decreasing number of 
building permits issued, is more likely to lead to more defaults among outstanding non-
rated Mello-Roos bonds. It further demonstrates that bonds do not default in their late 
years and very few bonds default in their early years. The major part of all redemptions 
occur for bonds between the ages six to ten and the 10-year treasury plays an important 
role in explaining the change in the status of a non-rated CFD bond from “normal” to 
redeemed but is not statistically significant in explaining the change in the status of a 
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